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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Small businesses play a pivotal role in the United States economy. 
“They are the foundation of the Nation’s economic growth: virtually 
all of the new jobs, 53 percent of employment, 51 percent of private 
sector output, and a disproportionate share of innovations come from 
small firms.”1 A large portion of these numbers, however, is driven by 
                                                                                                                    
 ∗ Assistant Professor, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky Univer-
sity. J.D., Notre Dame Law School. I would like to thank Professors Ed Brewer, Chris 
Gulinello and Antony Page for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this Article. 
 1. THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1 (1997); see also 
THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1 (2001) (“Small businesses 
have always been the backbone of our economy. They perennially account for most innova-
tion and job creation, and not just when our economy is robust and growing. Small busi-
nesses have sustained the economy in weaker times as well, and put us back on the track 
to long-term growth.”); Sulin Ba et al., Small Business in the Electronic Marketplace: A 
Blueprint for Survival, TEX. BUS. REV., Dec. 1999, at 1 (“Economists have long recognized 
the importance of small business in the economy. The active existence of numerous small 
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a small subset of small businesses—specifically, entrepreneurial 
companies that start small and grow fast.2 These so-called emerging 
companies3 “represent the potential for innovation, job creation and 
high returns for investors claimed by the small business commu-
nity.”4 Some of today’s most successful, established companies were 
small, emerging companies in the not-so-distant past. For example, 
in 1975 Microsoft Corporation was nothing more than a vision shared 
by two young men to put a personal computer in every home and of-
fice.5 Likewise, in 1971 Federal Express Corporation was nothing 
more than an idea set forth in a college economics term paper that 
received a “C” grade.6 In 2003 Microsoft and Federal Express em-
ployed 55,0007 and 134,0008 people and, in 2004, had market capi-
talizations of $306.85 billion9 and $24.29 billion,10 respectively. For 
fiscal year 2003, Microsoft’s net income was $13 billion on revenues 
of $32 billion,11 and Federal Express’s operating income was $786 
million on revenues of $16 billion.12 For fiscal year 2003, Microsoft 
and Federal Express paid $4.7 billion13 and $258 million,14 respec-
tively, in federal income taxes. 
                                                                                                                    
business firms, each exercising a reasonable degree of independence, is considered basic to 
the maintenance of a competitive market.”). 
 2. Jeffrey E. Sohl, The Early-Stage Equity Market in the USA, 1 VENTURE CAP.: 
INT’L J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 101, 105 (1999); see also Ronald L. Gilson, Engineering a 
Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 
1068 (2003) (“Beyond representing an important engine of macroeconomic growth and job 
creation, [emerging companies] have been a major force in commercializing cutting-edge 
science . . . .”); Steven H. Hobbs, Toward a Theory of Law and Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 241, 297 (1997) (“Between 1990 to 1994 [emerging companies] accounted for all 
of the nation’s net new jobs.”). 
 3. These companies are also sometimes referred to as gazelles. Hobbs, supra note 2, 
at 297. 
 4. Sohl, supra note 2, at 105. 
 5. JAMES WALLACE & JIM ERICKSON, HARD DRIVE: BILL GATES AND THE MAKING OF 
THE MICROSOFT EMPIRE 90 (1992). 
 6. Eugene Carlson, American Entrepreneurs: Federal Express Wasn’t an Overnight 
Success, WALL ST. J., June 6, 1989, at B2. 
 7. MICROSOFT CORP., ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2003 (FORM 10-
K), File No. 0-14278, at 7, available at  http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789019/00011931 
2503045632/d10k.htm [hereinafter MICROSOFT 10-K]. 
 8. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP., ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF 
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED MAY 31, 2003 (FORM 
10-K), File No. 1-7806, at 4, available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/230211/0001047 
46903024447/a2114482z10-k.htm [hereinafter FEDERAL EXPRESS 10-K]. 
 9. YAHOO! INC., key  statistics  for  Microsoft  Corp.,  at  http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s 
=msft (updated frequently, last visited Aug. 10, 2004). 
 10. YAHOO! INC., key   statistics    for   Fedex   Corp.,  at   http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s 
=fdx (updated frequently, last visited Aug. 10, 2004). 
 11. MICROSOFT 10-K, supra note 7, at 10. 
 12. FEDERAL EXPRESS 10-K, supra note 8, at 19. 
 13. MICROSOFT 10-K, supra note 7, at 19. 
 14. FEDERAL EXPRESS 10-K, supra note 8, at F-5. 
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 Obviously, most emerging companies do not enjoy the spectacular 
growth and success of Microsoft or Federal Express. Countless 
emerging companies do not even get out of the gate because they are 
unable to raise the necessary capital “to move promising technology 
from the laboratory to the marketplace.”15 This, of course, costs the 
United States untold thousands of jobs and innovations and billions 
of dollars of tax revenue.16 
 Many emerging companies fail to raise critical early-stage capital 
largely because of market inefficiencies.17 An assumption underlying 
financial theory is that capital markets are efficient and thereby all 
material information concerning sources of capital is available to 
companies seeking capital.18 This generally holds true with respect to 
established companies.19 For an established company, “financial 
markets supply a complete variety of financing instruments, with 
these markets being relatively accessible and the owner/manager left 
to decide the optimum mix of a financial structure based on the cost 
of capital.”20 This assumption may not hold true with respect to 
emerging companies.21 Emerging companies typically have limited 
collateral and operating histories and no public market for their 
stock. And oftentimes as a result, their only financing option is pri-
vate equity financing.22 Estimates indicate, however, that financial 
markets fall short by some $60 billion annually in meeting the de-
mand of small companies for early-stage private equity financing.23 
This unmet need is referred to as the funding gap.24 
 This funding gap for emerging companies seems to result from in-
formation inefficiencies.25 Sufficient capital appears to be available to 
fund the needs of emerging companies.26 However, sufficient informa-
tion about potential sources of early-stage capital is not available to 
emerging companies.27 Likewise, sufficient information about poten-
                                                                                                                    
 15. Jeffrey E. Sohl, The U.S. Angel and Venture Capital Markets: Recent Trends and 
Developments, J. PRIVATE EQUITY, Spring 2003, at 7, 14. 
 16. See Gilson, supra note 2, at 1077. 
 17. See Sohl, supra note 15, at 14. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON SMALL BUS., 
U.S. SENATE, SMALL BUSINESS EFFORTS TO FACILITATE EQUITY CAPITAL FORMATION 1 
(2000) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 23. Id. at 2; see also Sohl, supra note 2, at 110. 
 24. See Sohl, supra note 15, at 14; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 3-4 (“In 
general, . . . equity capital is widely viewed as less accessible and more costly per dollar 
raised for small businesses compared with large businesses.”). 
 25. See Sohl, supra note 15, at 14. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id.; see also JOHN FREEAR ET AL., U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., CREATING NEW 
CAPITAL MARKETS FOR EMERGING VENTURES 9 (1996) (“Private investing in early-stage 
ventures occurs in an inefficient market. There are no directories of private investors, no 
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tial investment opportunities is not available to those interested in 
investing in early-stage companies.28 As a result, “[a]n entrepreneur’s 
search for equity capital is often a time-consuming process, resulting 
in missed market opportunities and unsuccessful avenues.”29 
 This information gap is exacerbated by securities regulations that 
limit the avenues an emerging company can pursue in locating capi-
tal and providing the marketplace with information. An emerging 
company generally cannot, for example, contact every person in its 
region that owns a Lamborghini sports car to see if any would be in-
terested in making an early-stage private equity investment in the 
company.30 This is because both federal and state securities regula-
tions prohibit the use of general solicitation and advertising in pri-
vate placements.31 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) interprets this prohibition to restrict investors in a company’s 
private placement to those with whom the company or someone act-
ing on its behalf has a preexisting, substantive relationship.32 So 
unless the company or someone acting on its behalf has this requisite 
relationship with the Lamborghini owners, contacting them to par-
ticipate in the offering would violate the prohibition on general solici-
tation and advertising. 
 In light of this information gap and the importance of emerging 
companies to the nation’s well-being, this Article calls for new securi-
ties regulations that would allow emerging companies and others to 
engage in general solicitation and advertising in their quest for capi-
tal. Part I discusses the typical financing path of an emerging com-
pany and the importance of angel equity capital in this path. Part II 
describes the regulatory scheme applicable to raising private equity 
capital. It examines in depth the ban on general solicitation and ad-
vertising and finds the ban to have a negative impact on the capital-
raising efforts of emerging companies. Part III demonstrates that 
there is no strong ideological foundation for the ban. Thus, Part IV 
calls for regulatory reform to allow, subject to certain limitations, 
companies and broker-dealers to seek investors in private place-
ments through general solicitation and advertising, regardless of the 
                                                                                                                    
public records of their investment transactions, few vehicles exist for bringing together po-
tential investors and ventures seeking funds and transaction costs are high.”). 
 28. Sohl, supra note 15, at 14. 
 29. Id. 
 30. The assumption is that someone who owns a very expensive and high-powered 
sports car would likely have the funds and stomach for an early-stage investment in an 
emerging company. 
 31. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2003); ROSA M. MOLLER, CA. RESEARCH BUREAU, 
SECURITIES REGULATIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON SMALL BUSINESSES 3 (2000). 
 32. See infra text accompanying notes 125 and 126 for the definition of preexisting, 
substantive relationship. 
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preexisting relationship (or lack thereof) between the companies or 
broker-dealers and the potential investors. 
II.   EMERGING COMPANY FINANCING PATH 
 There are four recognized broad categories of equity financing 
that a typical emerging company requires as it grows and matures: 
seed financing, start-up financing, early-stage financing, and later-
stage financing.33 Seed financing represents the relatively small 
amount of funding needed by an entrepreneur to prove a concept.34 
Start-up financing is used to complete product development and be-
gin marketing.35 Early-stage financing is used for initial expansion.36 
Later-stage financing is used for major expansion to meet increasing 
sales volumes or to support an emerging company expecting to go 
public within six to twelve months.37  
 Seed funding is often supplied by the owner/investor through per-
sonal savings, credit card debt, and second home mortgages.38 Start-
up funding may initially come from friends and families.39 Once these 
sources are tapped out, an emerging company then looks to outside 
sources of financing. Generally speaking, funding could be in the 
form of equity, such as an investment in common or preferred stock, 
or debt, such as a bank loan. For emerging companies, however, debt 
is generally not an option—they do not have the necessary collateral, 
operating history, or proven track record to qualify for bank loans.40 
The primary source of equity capital at the start-up and early stages 
comes from angel investors.41 Thus, attracting the interest of angel 
investors is critical to the success of an emerging company.42  
 Angel investors are generally high-net worth individuals that 
typically possess substantial business and entrepreneurial experi-
ence.43 Oftentimes their investment capital and experience come from 
their own successes in starting, growing, and then cashing out of 
emerging companies.44 Angel investors typically invest in companies 
involved in technologies and markets in which they have some exper-
tise or familiarity and, therefore, take active roles in advising and 
                                                                                                                    
 33. Sohl, supra note 2, at 106; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 9. 
 34. Sohl, supra note 2, at 106. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 107. 
 39. Id. 
 40. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 5; see also FREEAR, supra note 27, at 5. 
 41. Sohl, supra note 2, at 108; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 3. 
 42. See Sohl, supra note 2, at 108; FREEAR, supra note 27, at 4. 
 43. Sohl, supra note 2, at 108; see also FREEAR, supra note 27, at 7-8; GAO REPORT, 
supra note 22, at 10. 
 44. See Sohl, supra note 2, at 108.  
6  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
 
mentoring the managers of these emerging companies.45 Thus, angel 
investors contribute not only capital but also business experience, 
which many entrepreneurs consider to be just as valuable as the 
capital invested by angel investors.46 
 A typical round of angel financing is in the $100 thousand to $2 
million range, involving six to eight angel investors.47 Estimates indi-
cate that between 300,000 and 350,000 angel investors invest 
roughly $30 billion every year in approximately 50,000 ventures.48 
This money is considered patient capital since angel investors typi-
cally have exit horizons on such investments of five to ten years or 
more.49 
 As an emerging company’s need for cash begins to outstrip the re-
sources of angel investors, the company will likely look to venture 
capital funds for larger rounds of equity financing.50 These funds are 
the primary source of later-stage financing for emerging companies.51 
Total investment by the venture capital industry has grown dramati-
cally during the last decade from approximately $2.7 billion annually 
in 1994 to between $30 and $35 billion in 2003.52 A typical round of 
venture financing is a “later-stage deal in the $10 to $15 million 
range.”53 To attract an investment by a venture capital fund, the 
emerging company will need to have progressed beyond the seed and 
start-up stages of its development and show signs of sustainable 
growth.54 Many, if not most, emerging companies fail to attract ven-
ture financing.55  
 As mentioned in the introduction, estimates indicate that the total 
unmet need for early-stage equity financing for small companies is 
$60 billion annually.56 This unmet need, or funding gap, is likely 
more than double the estimated $30 billion in early-stage equity fi-
nancing provided annually by angel investors. At the same time, the 
venture capital industry has undergone a systemic shift towards 
even later-stage and larger deals.57 Hence, the dramatic increase in 
                                                                                                                    
 45. FREEAR, supra note 27, at 8. 
 46. Sohl, supra note 15, at 12. 
 47. Id. at 13. 
 48. Id.  
 49. FREEAR, supra note 27, at 8; see also Sohl, supra note 2, at 111. 
 50. Sohl, supra note 15, at 13. 
 51. Id.; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 11. 
 52. Sohl, supra note 15, at 13. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Sohl, supra note 2, at 109.  
 55. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 3 (“[M]any small businesses have difficulty at-
tracting venture capital financing because of the selection criteria used by venture capital-
ists in deciding where to invest their funds.”). “[O]nly about 1 percent of all business plans 
submitted to venture capital funds typically has received financing in recent years . . . .” 
Id. at 20 (footnote omitted). 
 56. Id. at 2 (estimate based on 1996 study); see also Sohl, supra note 2, at 110. 
 57. Sohl, supra note 15, at 13; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 13. 
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venture capital funding over the last decade has done nothing to ad-
dress the funding gap at the start-up and early stages of the financ-
ing paths of emerging companies.58 Additionally, the speculation that 
the use of Internet-based technology by small companies seeking pri-
vate equity would help close the funding gap59 does not appear to 
have materialized—as of spring 2003, a significant funding gap re-
mains.60 Thus, a company that would have grown into the next Mi-
crosoft or Federal Express may have been conceived on more than 
one occasion but died in the seed stage because its founder was un-
able to obtain the necessary angel financing to survive.61  
 As alluded to in Part I, it appears that this funding gap is not due 
to a shortage of angel capital. Estimates suggest that the number of 
potential or latent angel investors exceeds the number of active angel 
investors by a ratio of five to one.62 Therefore, the potential pool of 
angel capital may be as large as $150 billion annually. Hence, getting 
these latent or potential angel investors to become active angel in-
vestors would likely eliminate the funding gap. 
 How then can an emerging company reach these potential angel 
investors? The commonsense answer is through marketing. However, 
since it is equity in the company that is being marketed, that is, se-
curities such as common or preferred stock, any such marketing 
must be done within the strictures of federal and state securities 
regulations. 
III.   FEDERAL AND STATE SECURITIES REGULATIONS 
 Pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”),63 it is il-
legal for anyone to offer or sell a security64 in the United States 
unless the offer and sale are registered with the SEC or are exempt 
from registration.65 The term offer includes “every attempt or offer to 
dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a 
security, for value.”66 This language has been construed much more 
                                                                                                                    
 58. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 13. 
 59. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital 
Barrier?, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 64 (1998) (“By reducing the cost of matching 
angels and investment opportunities on a national scale, the Internet may increase such 
matches.”). 
 60. See Sohl, supra note 15, at 11. 
 61. See id. at 13. 
 62. Sohl, supra note 2, at 108. 
 63. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77r (2000). 
 64. The term security is broadly defined under the Securities Act to include “any note, 
stock, treasury stock, . . . bond, debenture, . . . investment contract, . . . option, . . . or war-
rant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.” Id. § 77b(a)(1). 
 65. Id. § 77e(a). See generally 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 385-521 (3d ed. 1999). 
 66. Id. § 77b(a)(3). 
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broadly than the common law of contracts definition of offer.67 Hence, 
while under the common law of contracts, advertisements are not or-
dinarily construed as offers,68 an advertisement by a company seek-
ing investors in its securities would clearly constitute an offer for 
purposes of the Securities Act.69  
 Registering an offering with the SEC is expensive70 and time-
consuming.71 Further, successfully completing a registered offering 
generally requires that the issuer retain an underwriter to handle 
the deal.72 As a general rule, however, no underwriter will take a 
company public unless the company has, at a minimum: (1) annual 
revenue of $20 million, (2) net income of $1 million, and (3) the po-
tential to achieve and sustain significant growth rates (such as 
twenty percent or greater in revenues) for the next five to ten years.73 
Since few, if any, early-stage emerging companies meet the foregoing 
criteria, a registered offering is not an option for them. That leaves 
exempt offerings, or, in other words, offerings conducted in compli-
ance with exemptions from registration.74 The most commonly relied-
on exemptions for stock offerings by emerging companies are those 
provided by Regulation D under the Securities Act.75 
A.   Regulation D 
 Regulation D comprises Rules 501 through 508 and includes three 
exemptions from registration under the Securities Act. These exemp-
tions are contained in Rules 504, 505, and 506. Rules 501 through 
503 provide certain definitions and conditions that generally apply to 
each Regulation D exemption.76 Rule 507 disqualifies certain issuers 
from relying on any of the three Regulation D exemptions.77 Finally, 
                                                                                                                    
 67. 2 LOSS & SELIGMAN supra note  65, at 1138.19-.20 n.520. 
 68. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 27 (3d ed. 1957). 
 69. Publication of Information Prior to or After Effective Date of Registration State-
ment, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 3844 (Oct. 8, 1957), 1957 SEC LEXIS 332, at *7 
(example 1). 
 70. See GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 23 tbl.2 (citing NASDAQ, GOING PUBLIC (4th 
ed. 1999)). 
 71. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Going Public Through an Internet Direct Public Offering: 
A Sensible Alternative for Small Companies?, 53 FLA. L. REV. 529, 576-77 (2001). 
 72. See id. at 581-82. 
 73. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 21-22. As noted, this is only a general rule and, as 
such, is an oversimplification. Exceptions to the rule include companies that have an inno-
vative product in a hot market or that are, or are on track to be, first to market in a par-
ticular field. See Laird H. Simons III, Considerations in Selecting the Managing Under-
writer(s) for an Initial Public Offering, in HOW TO PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 
1999, at 37, 41 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Handbook Series No. B-1135, 1999). 
 74. See GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 27. 
 75. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (2003). 
 76. Id. §§ 230.501-.503. 
 77. Id. § 230.507. 
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Rule 508 provides issuers with relief for insignificant deviations from 
compliance with the requirement of a Regulation D exemption.78  
 Regulation D only provides exemptions from the registration re-
quirements of the Securities Act. It does not exempt an offering from 
the antifraud or civil liability provisions or any other provision of the 
federal securities laws.79 Nor does it provide an exemption from any 
applicable state law relating to the offer and sale of securities.80 Fur-
ther, the Regulation D provisions exempt from registration the offer-
ing of securities, not the securities themselves, and are available only 
to the issuer of the securities and not to resellers of the issuer’s secu-
rities.81  
 Rule 504 was promulgated under section 3(b) of the Securities 
Act.82 Under Rule 504, a company can offer and sell securities to an 
unlimited number of persons.83 The total dollar amount of the offer-
ing, however, cannot exceed $1 million less the aggregate offering 
price of all securities sold by the company during the preceding 
twelve months in reliance on Rule 504, Rule 505, or Regulation A or 
in violation of the registration requirements of the Securities Act.84 
Unlike securities issued in reliance on Rule 505 or 506, no specific in-
formation with respect to the company or the offering needs to be 
furnished to investors,85 and there is no limit on the number of “non-
accredited” investors that can participate in the offering.86 Rule 504 
is not available to a reporting company, that is, a company that is re-
quired to file periodic reports with the SEC under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”),87 a start-up company with no 
specific business plan, or an investment company.88 
                                                                                                                    
 78. Id. § 230.508. 
 79. Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Lim-
ited Offers and Sales, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 33-6389 (Mar. 8, 1982), 1982 SEC 
LEXIS 2167, at *13 (describing Preliminary Note 1 of Regulation D) [hereinafter Regula-
tion D Adopting Release]. 
 80. Id. (describing Preliminary Note 2 of Regulation D).  
 81. Id. at *14 (describing Preliminary Note 4 of Regulation D). 
 82. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2000). See infra text accompanying notes 333 and 334 for a de-
scription of Securities Act section 3(b). 
 83. Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the “Seed Capital” Exemption, Release No. 
33-7644 (Feb. 25, 1999), 1999 SEC LEXIS 408, at *3 [hereinafter “Seed Capital” Exemption 
Release]. 
 84. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (2003). 
 85. 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 464-65 (2002); see also 
GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 28. 
 86. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 85. 
 87. A company does not have to file periodic reports with the SEC unless its securities 
are registered under the Exchange Act. Registration is generally required of any class of 
equity securities of a company with $1 million or more in total assets held of record by be-
tween 500 and 750 shareholders or at least 750 shareholders. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.12g-1. See generally BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 85, at 585-86. A company that 
does not fall within these requirements can nevertheless voluntarily register. Id. at 586-87. 
 88. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a).  
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 Rule 505 was also promulgated under section 3(b) of the Securi-
ties Act89 and provides an exemption for offerings of up to $5 million 
less the aggregate offering price of all securities sold by the company 
during the preceding twelve months in reliance on Rule 504, Rule 
505, or Regulation A or in violation of the registration requirements 
of the Securities Act.90 Neither the issuer nor anyone acting on its 
behalf can solicit investors in an offering made in reliance on Rule 
505 through any form of “general solicitation” or “general advertis-
ing.”91  
 While under Rule 505 a company can offer and sell securities to 
an unlimited number of “accredited” investors,92 there must be no 
more than, or the issuer must reasonably believe that there are no 
more than, thirty-five nonaccredited investors in the offering.93 Rule 
501(a) defines accredited investor as, among other things, banks, in-
surance companies, mutual funds, and certain other specified insti-
tutional investors;94 “[a]ny natural person whose individual net 
worth, or joint net worth with that person’s spouse, at the time of his 
purchase exceeds $1,000,000”;95 “[a]ny natural person who had an in-
dividual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent 
years or joint income with that person’s spouse in excess of $300,000 
in each of those years and has a reasonable expectation of reaching 
the same income level in the current year”;96 and executive officers97 
and directors of the issuer.98 Additionally, the issuer must furnish to 
any nonaccredited investors that purchase securities in the offering 
certain specified information about the issuer and the offering within 
a reasonable time prior to the purchase.99 Securities issued pursuant 
to Rule 502 are considered “restricted securities,”100 which means 
                                                                                                                    
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. § 230.505(b)(2)(i). 
 91. Id. §§ 230.505(b)(1), .502(c). 
 92. Regulation D Adopting Release, supra note 79, at *43-*44, *79. 
 93. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii). 
 94. Id. § 230.501(a)(1). 
 95. Id. § 230.501(a)(5). 
 96. Id. § 230.501(a)(6). 
 97. Id. § 230.501(a)(4). Rule 501(f) defines executive officer as “the president, any vice 
president in charge of a principal business unit, division or function (such as sales, admini-
stration or finance), any other officer who performs a policy making function, or any other 
person who performs similar policy making functions for the issuer.” Id. § 230.501(f). 
 98. Id. § 230.501(a)(4). 
 99. Id. § 230.502(b)(1). While Rule 502(b)(1) does not require that any information be 
furnished to accredited investors in a Rule 505 or 506 offering, Rule 502(b)(1) includes a 
note that provides as follows: “When an issuer provides information to investors pursuant 
to paragraph (b)(1), it should consider providing such information to accredited investors 
as well, in view of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.” Id. 
 100. Id. § 230.144(a)(3)(ii). 
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they cannot be resold unless certain holding periods or other condi-
tions, or both, are met.101 
 Rule 506 was promulgated under section 4(2) of the Securities 
Act102 and not section 3(b); therefore, there is no monetary limit on 
the size of a Rule 506 offering. Like Rule 505, under Rule 506 a com-
pany can offer and sell securities to an unlimited number of accred-
ited investors,103 but there must be no more than, or the issuer must 
reasonably believe that there are no more than, thirty-five nonac-
credited investors in the offering.104 Rule 506, however, includes an 
additional requirement not included in Rule 505 that 
[e]ach purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or 
with his purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and ex-
perience in financial and business matters that he is capable of 
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or 
the issuer reasonably believes immediately prior to making any 
sale that such purchaser comes within this description.105 
Like Rule 505, neither the issuer nor anyone acting on its behalf can 
solicit investors in an offering made in reliance on Rule 506 through 
any form of “general solicitation” or “general advertising,”106 securi-
ties issued in reliance on Rule 506 are considered “restricted securi-
ties,”107 and the issuer has to furnish certain specified information to 
any nonaccredited investors that purchase securities in the offer-
ing.108 
 In addition to complying with federal securities laws, anyone of-
fering or selling securities must also comply with the securities laws 
of the states in which they are making the offers and sales, all of 
which, except for the State of New York, require registration of the 
offering with state regulators unless the offering falls within an ex-
emption therefrom.109 In 1996, however, Congress passed the Na-
tional Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA).110 NSMIA, 
among other things, amended section 18 of the Securities Act to pro-
vide that no state law, rule, regulation, or order “requiring, or with 
respect to, registration or qualification of securities, or registration or 
                                                                                                                    
 101. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 85, at 523; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 
54. 
 102. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a). See infra Part IV.A for a description of Securities Act 
section 4(2). 
 103. See Regulation D Adopting Release, supra note 79, at *46, *80. 
 104. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i). 
 105. Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). 
 106. Id. §§ 230.506(b)(1), .502(c). 
 107. See id. § 230.144(a)(3)(ii). 
 108. Id. §§ 230.506(b)(1), .502(b). 
 109. 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 69. 
 110. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 
Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2000)) [hereinafter NSMIA]. See generally 
1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 60-67. 
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qualification of securities transactions, shall directly or indirectly 
apply to a security that . . . is a covered security.”111 The definition of 
a covered security includes a security issued pursuant to Rule 506, 
but does not include a security issued pursuant to Rule 504 or Rule 
505.112 As a result, most private placements are conducted in compli-
ance with Rule 506 since doing so avoids having to comply with state 
registration and exemption requirements.113 This saves both time and 
money, especially for multistate offerings.114 Rule 506 has the addi-
tional advantage of having no monetary cap on the size of the offer-
ing, unlike Rule 504 and Rule 505 offerings.115 
B.   The Prohibition on General Solicitation and Advertising 
 As mentioned above, Regulation D prohibits the use of general so-
licitation or general advertising to solicit investors in a Rule 505 and 
Rule 506 offering. Specifically, Rule 502(c) of Regulation D provides 
that “neither the issuer nor any person acting on its behalf shall offer 
or sell the securities by any form of general solicitation or general 
advertising.”116 Hence, analyzing the application of Rule 502(c) can be 
divided into the following two inquiries: (1) Is the communication 
general?; and (2) Is the communication made by or on behalf of the 
issuer?117 If the answer to either of these questions is no, the issuer 
will not be in violation of Rule 502(c).118 Each of these inquiries is 
discussed below. 
1.   General Solicitation/Advertising 
 The terms general advertising and general solicitation are not de-
fined in Rule 502(c) nor were the terms discussed in the release 
adopting Regulation D.119 Rule 502(c) does, however, state that solic-
iting investors through “(1) [a]ny advertisement, article, notice or 
                                                                                                                    
 111. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1).  
 112. Id. § 77r(b)(4)(D); see also BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 85, at 1354-55. 
 113. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D). A state can require an issuer conducting a Rule 506 offer-
ing in that state to make a notice filing of the offering. Id.; see also GAO REPORT, supra 
note 22, at 30 (“According to SEC statistics, rule 506 offerings have increased dramatically 
since 1994, growing from 5,414 in that year to 13,112 in 1999.”). 
 114. Each of the fifty states has its own securities laws. These laws lack uniformity in 
many areas, including registration requirements and exemptions therefrom. 1 LOSS & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 31-42. Thus, an issuer conducting a multistate private place-
ment subject to state registration requirements would incur additional legal fees in navi-
gating what could be a complicated maze of overlapping and varying state laws. See Sjos-
trom, supra note 71, at 587. 
 115. See supra text accompanying notes 84 and 90. 
 116. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2003). 
 117. Interpretive Release on Regulation D, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 33-6455 
(Mar. 3, 1982), 1983 SEC LEXIS 2288, at *45 [hereinafter Interpretive Release on Regula-
tion D]. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Regulation D Adopting Release, supra note 79. 
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other communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or simi-
lar media or broadcast over television or radio; [or] (2) [a]ny seminar 
or meeting whose attendees have been invited by any general solici-
tation or general advertising”120 would constitute general solicitation 
or advertising. Thus, it is clear from the first example above that an 
issuer conducting a Rule 506 offering could not place an advertise-
ment in, for example, the Wall Street Journal soliciting investors in 
the offering.121 The second example is not of much additional help be-
cause it is circular in that it turns on the definition of general solici-
tation or general advertising.  
 The SEC has provided guidance on what constitutes general so-
licitation or advertising mostly through no-action letters.122 In inter-
preting the ban on general solicitation and advertising, the SEC has 
focused on the relationship between the solicitor and the potential 
investor.123 Specifically, for a communication to a potential investor 
not to be considered general solicitation or advertising, the SEC re-
quires a preexisting, substantive relationship between the solicitor 
and potential investor.124 The SEC considers a relationship preexist-
ing if it is established prior to the solicitation for the particular offer-
ing.125 The SEC considers a relationship substantive if it “would en-
able the issuer (or a person acting on its behalf) to be aware of the fi-
nancial circumstances or sophistication of the persons with whom the 
relationship exists or that otherwise are of some substance and dura-
tion.”126 While the SEC asserts “that prior relationship is [not] the 
only way to show the absence of general solicitation,”127 to date, the 
                                                                                                                    
 120. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c). 
 121. See 1-1 SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES: TRANSACTIONS AND LITIGATION § 
1.03[2][b][iii] (A.A. Sommer, Jr. ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2003), available at LEXIS Se-
curities, Treatises & Analytical Materials; see also Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int’l Franchises, 
Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 689 (5th Cir. 1971) (“[P]ublic advertising is incompatible with the claim 
of private offering.”), rev’d in part on other grounds, Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988). 
 122. A no-action letter is a method of securing informal advice from the SEC on a spe-
cific proposed transaction. In a no-action letter, the SEC advises the recipient whether it is 
likely to bring legal action if the proposed transaction occurs or will take no action. See 
2 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 532-33 n.29.  
 123. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 85, at 472; see also Kenman Corp., Securities Act of 
1934 Release No. 34-21962 (Apr. 19, 1985), 1985 SEC LEXIS 1717, at *9 n.6 (“In determin-
ing what constitutes a general solicitation, the Commission’s Division of Corporation Fi-
nance has underscored the existence and substance of pre-existing relationships between 
the issuer and those being solicited.”) [hereinafter Kenman Corp. Release]; Woodtrails-
Seattle Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (July 8, 1982), 1982 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2662, at *1-*2; 
Interpretive Release on Regulation D, supra note 117, at *46. 
 124. 3 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 65, as 1440; see also Robert T. Willis, Jr., P.C., 
SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 18, 1988), 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 34, at *2. 
 125. See E.F. Hutton & Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 3, 1985), 1985 SEC No-Act. 
LEXIS 2917, at *2. 
 126. Mineral Lands Research & Mktg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 4, 1985), 
1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2811, at *2. 
 127. Regulation D, Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 33-6825 (Mar. 15, 1989), 1989 
SEC LEXIS 520, at *8 n.12. 
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SEC has failed to issue any no-action letter finding the absence of 
general solicitation in the absence of such relationship.128 
2.   By or on Behalf of the Issuer 
 In a private placement, investors are typically solicited by the is-
suer’s management or employees of an investment banking firm re-
tained by the issuer to solicit investors. In these situations, it is obvi-
ous that the investors are solicited by or on behalf of the issuer. 
Questions, however, sometimes arise concerning whether an unre-
lated third-party communication was made on behalf of an issuer.129  
 For example, in the Tax Investment Information Corporation no-
action letter,130 the SEC considered whether the publication of an 
analysis of private placements by individuals who had no connections 
to the issuers or the offerings being analyzed would violate Rule 
502(c).131 The SEC noted that Regulation D does not directly prohibit 
such a third party communication but “refused to agree that such a 
publication would be permitted under Regulation D because of its 
susceptability [sic] to use by participants in an offering.”132 Under 
this “susceptible-to-use” theory, a Rule 506 offering could be 
thwarted133 by a third-party publication of an analysis of the offering 
even if the issuer can prove it in no way authorized or assisted in 
preparing the analysis. 
C.   Effect of the Prohibition on General Solicitation and Advertising 
 The end result of the SEC’s narrow interpretation of what does 
not constitute general solicitation or advertising is that to complete a 
successful private placement, an emerging company must either (1) 
have preexisting relationships with a large number of accredited in-
vestors or (2) know or hire someone who does. Otherwise, an emerg-
ing company is left with the very difficult task of attracting buyers to 
a product, that is, its securities, without advertising. Common sense 
dictates that the company is doomed to fail. 
 The financial industry has responded to the plight of the emerging 
company in pursuit of equity capital. Note that implicit in the lan-
guage “the issuer [or] any person acting on its behalf” in Rule 
                                                                                                                    
 128. SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES, supra note 121, at § 1.03[2]; see also Patrick 
Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38 EMORY L.J. 67, 107 (1989). 
 129. See generally Daugherty, supra note 128, at 93-102. 
 130. Tax Investment Info. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 7, 1983), 1983 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 1737. 
 131. Interpretive Release on Regulation D, supra note 117, at *47. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Rule 502(a) provides that “[a]ll sales that are part of the same [R]egulation D of-
fering must meet all of the terms and conditions of [R]egulation D.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) 
(2003). 
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502(c)134 is the concept that the solicitor can be someone other than 
the issuer, for example, an investment banking firm.135 This means 
that investment banking firms can, in effect, rent their preexisting, 
substantive relationships to companies seeking private equity. Typi-
cally, an emerging company in need of private equity will retain an 
investment banking firm to solicit investors on behalf of the com-
pany, especially those investors with whom the investment banking 
firm has the requisite preexisting, substantive relationships. In ex-
change for this service, an investment banking firm charges a com-
mission of up to ten percent of the gross offering proceeds plus ex-
penses. The firm may also command common stock warrants and the 
contractual right to participate in future company offerings, either of 
which can end up being much more lucrative than the initial cash 
commission.  
 Hence, an investment banking firm has a strong incentive to build 
a pool of accredited investors with which the firm has the requisite 
preexisting, substantive relationship.136 A large pool allows an in-
vestment banking firm to quickly raise sizeable amounts of private 
equity which, in turn, allows the firm to attract the most desirable 
emerging companies as clients, that is, those in hot market sectors. 
In the 1985 Bateman Eichler no-action letter, the SEC provided 
guidance on how an investment banking firm can build up its pool of 
potential investors in Regulation D offerings without running afoul of 
the Rule 502(c) ban on general solicitation and advertising.137 
 As described in the Bateman Eichler no-action letter, Bateman 
Eichler was a licensed broker-dealer that operated in forty-seven 
states and regularly acted as a selling agent in connection with pri-
vate offerings of limited partnership interests in reliance on Rule 505 
and Rule 506 of Regulation D.138 In an effort to expand its pool of 
qualified offerees, Bateman Eichler proposed establishing a program 
for identifying potential investors.139 The proposed programs would 
involve limited monthly mailings by Bateman Eichler account execu-
tives to local professionals and businessmen, such as attorneys, ac-
countants, and corporate executives.140 The mailing would consist of a 
                                                                                                                    
 134. Id. § 230.502(c). 
 135. See H. B. Shaine & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 1, 1987), 1987 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 2004, at *1 (“[I]n most cases a substantive relationship must exist between the 
issuer or its agents and the offerees . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 136. See Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of “Techno-
logical Disintermediation” for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING 
BUS. L. 1, 7 (1998). 
 137. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 3, 1985), 1985 
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2918. 
 138. Id. at *3. 
 139. Id. at *4. 
 140. Id. 
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letter and a questionnaire.141 The account executives would then re-
view the completed questionnaires and contact the respondents to 
obtain additional personal and financial information.142 Bateman 
Eichler would then place respondents, from whom it obtained suffi-
cient additional information, on a list of prospective offerees for the 
type of programs they indicated were of interest and for which Bate-
man Eichler deemed the respondents suitable.143 
 The program would include procedures so that no respondent 
would be solicited for an offering which was ongoing or contemplated 
at the time of the initial mailing to that respondent.144 Further, 
Bateman Eichler would wait at least forty-five days from the time of 
the initial mailing before soliciting a respondent to invest in an offer-
ing.145 
 Under the above facts, the SEC stated that “the proposed program 
of contacting prospective offerees does not constitute an offer to sell 
securities.”146 The SEC stressed the fact that the solicitation would be 
generic and would not refer to any specific ongoing or contemplated 
offering of Bateman Eichler.147 The SEC also emphasized that Bate-
man Eichler “will implement procedures designed to insure that per-
sons solicited are not offered any securities that were offered or con-
templated for offering at the time of the solicitation.”148  
 The SEC also concluded “that later offers to persons who respond 
to the mailings would not be deemed made by a general solicitation 
as a result of the initial solicitation provided a substantive relation-
ship has been established with the offeree between the time of the 
initial solicitation and the later offer.”149 The SEC noted that Bate-
man Eichler could establish a substantive relationship with “a per-
son who has provided a satisfactory response to a questionnaire that 
enables Bateman Eichler with sufficient information to evaluate the 
prospective offeree’s sophistication and financial circumstances.”150 
 The SEC provided further guidance in the 1987 H.B. Shaine & Co. 
no-action letter.151 Shaine was a registered broker-dealer and a mem-
ber of the New York Stock Exchange.152 Similar to Bateman Eichler, 
it proposed using a questionnaire to identify potential investors in 
                                                                                                                    
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at *4-*5. 
 143. Id. at *5. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at *1. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at *1-*2. 
 150. Id. at *2. 
 151. H.B. Shaine & Co., supra note 135. 
 152. Id. at *3. 
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Regulation D offerings.153 Shaine anticipated that some of the indi-
viduals responding to the questionnaires would have no previous re-
lationship with Shaine.154 The questionnaire, among other things, 
called for specific information about a respondent’s employment his-
tory, business experience, education, investment experience, income, 
and net worth.155 The questionnaire also requested the respondent’s 
opinion on his ability to evaluate the merits and risks of venture 
capital investments.156 
 Shaine indicated that the questionnaire would be updated annu-
ally.157 Shaine also indicated, consistent with the SEC’s position in 
Bateman Eichler, that sufficient time will have elapsed between a 
respondent initially completing the questionnaire and being solicited 
for a particular offering.158 The SEC concluded that the above proce-
dure “would establish a preexisting substantive relationship with a 
respondent provided that the respondent furnishes complete re-
sponses to the questionnaire.”159 The SEC, in effect, endorsed a ques-
tionnaire form that an investment banking firm could use to estab-
lish substantive relationships and build up its pool.160 It also chan-
neled Regulation D financings through broker-dealers since they 
                                                                                                                    
 153. Id. at *1. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Id. at *4. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at *1-*2. 
 159. Id. at *2. 
 160. The SEC reaffirmed and extended the questionnaire approach in its 1996 
IPONET no-action letter. IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter (July 26, 1996), 1996 SEC No-
Act. Lexis 642. IPONET established a website where it intended to post private offering 
materials accessible only by password. Id. at *8-*10. To obtain a password, an investor 
would have to complete an online questionnaire modeled after the H.B. Shaine question-
naire. Id. at *9. The SEC endorsed the method stating that 
[t]he qualification of accredited or sophisticated investors in the manner de-
scribed and the posting of a notice of a private offering in a password-protected 
page of IPONET accessible only to IPONET members who have qualified as ac-
credited investors would not involve any form of “general solicitation” or “gen-
eral advertising” within the meaning of Rule 502(c) of Securities Act Regulation 
D. In reaching this conclusion, we note that (a) both the invitation to complete 
the questionnaire used to determine whether an investor is accredited or so-
phisticated and the questionnaire itself will be generic in nature and will not 
reference any specific transactions posted or to be posted on the password-
protected page of IPONET; (b) the password-protected page of IPONET will be 
available to a particular investor only after Gallagher has made the determina-
tion that the particular potential investor is accredited or sophisticated; and (c) 
a potential investor could purchase securities only in transactions that are 
posted on the password-protected page of IPONET after that investor’s qualifi-
cation with IPONET.  
Id. at *1-*2. 
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were the only entities with the financial motivation and expertise to 
prequalify potential investors.161 
D.   Exceptions to the Prohibition on General Solicitation and 
Advertising 
 The SEC has recognized that the ban on general solicitation and 
general advertising “hampers the utility of [Regulation D] exemp-
tion[s] and may raise the costs to companies of trying to do these ex-
empt offerings.”162 In fact, the SEC has sought public comments on 
whether to eliminate the ban.163 While to date the ban remains in-
tact, over the past twenty years the SEC has, from time to time, 
promulgated new rules and regulations and amended existing rules 
and regulations, ameliorating its effect to a limited extent. These 
rules and regulations include Rule 135c,164 Rule 135e,165 Rule 155,166 
Rule 504,167 Regulation A,168 and Regulation CE,169 each of which is 
described briefly below. 
1.   Rule 135c 
 The SEC adopted Rule 135c in April 1994.170 The Rule allows an 
issuer to notify the public that it “proposes to make, is making or has 
                                                                                                                    
 161. Langevoort, supra note 136, at 7. It is not clear whether an emerging company 
could itself prequalify investors pursuant to the Shaine-type procedures. In a 2000 Re-
lease, the SEC stated: 
Generally, staff interpretations of whether a “pre-existing, substantive rela-
tionship” exists have been limited to procedures established by broker-dealers 
in connection with their customers. This is because traditional broker-dealer 
relationships require that a broker-dealer deal fairly with, and make suitable 
recommendations to, customers, and thus, implies that a substantive relation-
ship exists between the broker-dealer and its customers. We have long stated, 
however, that the presence or absence of a general solicitation is always de-
pendent on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Thus, there 
may be facts and circumstances in which a third party, other than a registered 
broker-dealer, could establish a “pre-existing, substantive relationship” suffi-
cient to avoid a “general solicitation.” 
Use of Electronic Media, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 33-7856 (Apr. 28, 2000), 2000 
SEC LEXIS 847, at *60 (footnote omitted). 
 162. Exemption for Certain California Limited Issues, Release No. 33-7185 (June 27, 
1995), 1995 SEC LEXIS 1522, at *14. 
 163. Id. at *15. 
 164. 17 C.F.R. § 230.135c (2003). 
 165. Id. § 230.135e. 
 166. Id. § 230.155. 
 167. Id. § 230.504. 
 168. Id. §§ 230.251-.263. 
 169. Id. § 230.1001. 
 170. Simplification of Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign Compa-
nies; Safe Harbors for Public Announcements of Unregistered Offerings and Broker-Dealer 
Research Reports, Securities Act of 1993 Release No. 33-7053, Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 Release No. 34-33918 (Apr. 19, 1994), 1994 SEC LEXIS 1298  [hereinafter Public An-
nouncement Safe Harbor Release]. 
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made an offering of securities not registered or required to be regis-
tered under the [Securities] Act.”171 The notice “may take the form of 
a news release or a written communication directed to security hold-
ers or employees, as the case may be, or other published state-
ments.”172 Hence, Rule 135c allows an issuer to advertise a Regula-
tion D private placement notwithstanding the Rule 502(c) prohibition 
against general solicitation and advertising. This point was made 
clear by the SEC when, in connection with adopting Rule 135c, it 
amended Rule 502(c) to specifically exclude 135c notices from such 
prohibition.173  
 A Rule 135c notice is subject to a number of limitations. The no-
tice must not be “used for the purpose of conditioning the market in 
the United States for any of the securities offered”174 and must state 
“that the securities offered will not be or have not been registered 
under the Act and may not be offered or sold in the United States ab-
sent registration or an applicable exemption from registration re-
quirements.”175 The rule allows the notice to include only basic infor-
mation about the issuer and the offering.176 Further, Rule 135c is 
only available to United States issuers that are required to file peri-
                                                                                                                    
 171. 17 C.F.R. § 230.135c(a). 
 172. Id. § 230.135c(b). 
 173. Public Announcement Safe Harbor Release, supra note 170, at *22 n.46; see also 
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c). 
 174. 17 C.F.R. § 230.135c(a)(1). 
 175. Id. § 230.135c(a)(2). 
 176. This information is limited to:  
(i) The name of the issuer;  
(ii) The title, amount and basic terms of the securities offered, the amount of 
the offering, if any, made by selling security holders, the time of the offering 
and a brief statement of the manner and purpose of the offering without nam-
ing the underwriters;  
(iii) In the case of a rights offering to security holders of the issuer, the class of 
securities the holders of which will be or were entitled to subscribe to the secu-
rities offered, the subscription ratio, the record date, the date upon which the 
rights are proposed to be or were issued, the term or expiration date of the 
rights and the subscription price, or any of the foregoing;  
(iv) In the case of an offering of securities in exchange for other securities of the 
issuer or of another issuer, the name of the issuer and the title of the securities 
to be surrendered in exchange for the securities offered, the basis upon which 
the exchange may be made, or any of the foregoing;  
(v) In the case of an offering to employees of the issuer or to employees of any 
affiliate of the issuer, the name of the employer and class or classes of employ-
ees to whom the securities are offered, the offering price or basis of the offering 
and the period during which the offering is to be or was made or any of the 
foregoing; and  
(vi) Any statement or legend required by State or foreign law or administrative 
authority. 
Public Announcement Safe Harbor Release, supra note 170, at *30-*31. 
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odic reports with the SEC under the Exchange Act and certain for-
eign issuers.177  
 An emerging company generally is not required to file periodic re-
ports with the SEC until after its initial public offering.178 Hence, 
Rule 135c will generally not be available to a private emerging com-
pany. I suspect this is not a big loss to emerging companies since, 
from a marketing perspective, the odds of attracting an investor 
through a Rule 135c notice seem quite low as a result of the limited 
information allowed in the notice.  
 The SEC did not, however, adopt Rule 135c to enhance the ability 
of reporting companies to attract investors in their private place-
ments. Instead, the SEC adopted Rule 135c to address the conflict 
between a reporting company’s obligation to keep investors informed 
of material developments, including raising funds through a private 
placement, and the prohibition against general solicitation and gen-
eral advertising.179 Nonetheless, Rule 135c certainly represents a 
narrowing of the prohibition against general solicitation and general 
advertising by the SEC and recognition by the SEC, at least in one 
specific area, of a problem with such a prohibition. 
2.   Rule 135e 
 In October 1997, the SEC adopted Rule 135e,180 which, among 
other things, provides a safe harbor for foreign private issuers181 re-
lating to press conferences held outside the United States and press-
                                                                                                                    
 177. Id. at *29. An issuer is not required to file periodic disclosure documents with the 
SEC unless its securities are registered under the Exchange Act. See supra note 87 for a 
brief description of when an issuer is required to register under the Exchange Act. 
 178. See supra note 87. Because of the time and expense involved in preparing the fil-
ings and the fact that the filings and, hence, sensitive information about the company are a 
few mouse clicks away to anyone with web access, most emerging companies avoid for as 
long as possible being required to file periodic reports. 
 179. See Public Announcement Safe Harbor Release, supra note 170, at *8. 
 180. See Offshore Press Conferences, Meetings with Company Representatives Con-
ducted Offshore and Press-Related Materials Released Offshore, Securities Act of 1933 Re-
lease No. 33-7470, Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-39227 (Oct. 10, 1997), 1997 SEC 
LEXIS 2155, at *1 [hereinafter Exemption for Standardized Options Release]. 
 181. The Securities Act defines a foreign private issuer as 
any foreign issuer other than a foreign government except an issuer meeting 
the following conditions:  
 (1) More than 50 percent of the outstanding voting securities of such issuer 
are directly or indirectly owned of record by residents of the United States; and  
 (2) Any of the following:  
 (i) The majority of the executive officers or directors are United States citi-
zens or residents;  
 (ii) More than 50 percent of the assets of the issuer are located in the United 
States; or  
 (iii) The business of the issuer is administered principally in the United 
States. 
17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2003). 
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related materials released outside of the United States.182 The SEC 
viewed Rule 135e as necessary because American journalists were 
routinely being excluded from offshore press activities of foreign is-
suers, potentially putting American investors at a disadvantage.183 
Foreign private issuers were excluding American journalists out of 
concern that the journalists would disseminate information in the 
United States that would violate United States securities laws such 
as the ban on general solicitation and advertising.184 
 To qualify for the safe harbor, a foreign private issuer must meet 
several conditions. First, the press activities must occur outside of 
the United States.185 Second, the offering to which the press activities 
relate must not be conducted solely within the United States.186 
Third, access to the offshore press activities must be available to both 
American and foreign journalists.187 Fourth, any written press-
related materials pertaining to the United States portion of the offer-
ing must include certain cautionary statements188 and may not in-
clude a purchase order or coupon whereby a person could indicate in-
terest in the offering.189  
 Rule 502(c) of Regulation D expressly excludes press activities 
that fall within the Rule 135e safe harbor from the definition of gen-
eral solicitation and advertising.190 Hence, a foreign private issuer 
could theoretically obtain United States investors in a Regulation D 
offering who were located through offshore press releases in compli-
ance with Rule 135e that were widely circulated in the United 
States. 
                                                                                                                    
 182. Id. § 230.135e. 
 183. Exemption for Standardized Options Release, supra note 180, at *3. 
 184. Id. at *4-*5. 
 185. 17 C.F.R. § 230.135e(a). 
 186. Id. § 230.135e(a)(1). 
 187. Id. § 230.135e(a)(2). 
 188. Such materials must state that 
the written press related materials are not an offer of securities for sale in the 
United States, that securities may not be offered or sold in the United States 
absent registration or an exemption from registration, that any public offering 
of securities to be made in the United States will be made by means of a pro-
spectus that may be obtained from the issuer or the selling security holder and 
that will contain detailed information about the company and management, as 
well as financial statements. 
Id. § 230.135e(b)(1). 
 189. Id. § 230.135e(b)(3). 
 190. Id. § 230.502(c). 
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3.   Rule 155 
 The SEC adopted Rule 155 in January 2001 to address specific 
problems caused by the concept of integration.191 Under the concept 
of integration, two or more offerings, which an issuer structured as 
separate exempt offerings, may be “integrated,” or treated as one lar-
ger offering for which no exemption is available.192 Integration is 
generally intended to prevent an issuer from circumventing the reg-
istration requirements of the Securities Act by structuring a large of-
fering for which no exemption is available as two or more smaller ex-
empt offerings.193 If the SEC integrates a series of apparently exempt 
offerings, the integrated offering must qualify for an exemption.194 If 
it does not, since by definition the integrated offering was not regis-
tered, all sales in connection therewith will have been made in viola-
tion of section 5 of the Securities Act,195 resulting in, among other 
things, each purchaser in the offering having a right to rescind the 
transaction.196 
 In determining whether a series of exempt offerings should be in-
tegrated into one offering, the SEC considers the following five fac-
tors: (1) whether the offerings are part of a single plan of financing; 
(2) whether the offerings are made for the same general purpose; (3) 
whether the offerings involve the issuance of the same class of secu-
rities; (4) whether the offerings are made at or about the same time; 
and (5) whether the offerings involve the same type of considera-
tion.197 This multifactor test has been criticized as being subjective198 
and lacking clarity.199 Adding to the murkiness is the lack of express 
guidance from the SEC or the courts on how to weigh the factors 
when analyzing a series of offerings.200 It is clear, however, that not 
all factors need be present for two or more offerings to be inte-
grated.201  
 Regulation D contains an integration safe harbor that applies to 
Rule 506 offerings. Rule 502(a) provides: 
                                                                                                                    
 191. Integration of Abandoned Offerings, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 33-7943 
(Jan. 26, 2001), 2001 SEC LEXIS 166, at *1 [hereinafter Integration of Abandoned Offer-
ings Release]. 
 192. 3 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 1231-32. 
 193. Id.; Cheryl L. Wade, The Integration of Securities Offerings: A Proposed Formula 
That Fosters the Policies of Securities Regulation, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 199, 209 (1994). 
 194. Wade, supra note 193, at 200.  
 195. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000). 
 196. See id. § 77l(a). 
 197. Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 33-4552 (Nov. 
6, 1962), 1962 SEC LEXIS 166, at *10; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (2003); 3 LOSS & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 1232-42. 
 198. 3 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 1233 n.7. 
 199. Wade, supra note 193, at 200-01. 
 200. 3 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 1242. 
 201. Id. 
2004]                          RELAXING THE BAN 23 
 
Offers and sales that are made more than six months before the 
start of a [R]egulation D offering or are made more than six 
months after completion of a [R]egulation D offering will not be 
considered part of that [R]egulation D offering, so long as during 
those six month periods there are no offers or sales of securities by 
or for the issuer that are of the same or a similar class as those of-
fered or sold under [R]egulation D.202 
It is not, however, uncommon for a fast-growing emerging company 
to have to raise equity financing through Rule 506 private place-
ments separated by less than six months. In such a situation, the 
Rule 502(a) safe harbor will be unavailable, and the issuer will have 
to obtain legal advice on the likelihood, based on the above five fac-
tors, of the second offering being integrated with the first.203 The cost 
of this legal advice is considerable and often comes at a time in the 
life of an emerging company when cash is extremely precious.204 Alas, 
because of the murkiness of the five-factor test, issuers’ counsel are 
unable to provide any guarantee against a later finding of integra-
tion.205  
 It is at a critical stage in the life of the unlucky emerging company 
that the integration doctrine and the ban on general solicitation and 
advertising combine to hamper the company’s ability to obtain 
greatly needed equity capital—immediately following the company’s 
unsuccessful, registered initial public offering. This is because the 
SEC views the mere filing of a registration statement as general so-
licitation of investors in the offering.206 It is not uncommon, especially 
during the last few years, for a company to incur hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars in expenses207 to get to the verge of going public only 
to have the offering delayed or abandoned due to market condi-
tions.208 This leaves the emerging company with large bills to pay 
from the failed public offering, in addition to its existing capital 
needs, but no offering proceeds. At this point, generally the only op-
                                                                                                                    
 202. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a). 
 203. Wade, supra note 193, at 200-01. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 201. 
 206. New Rule 155—Two Integration Safe Harbors, CORP. COUNS., Jan.-Feb. 2001, 
available at http://thecorporatecounsel.net (subscription needed or on file with author) 
[hereinafter New Rule 155]. A registration statement is publicly available shortly after fil-
ing through the SEC’s website. 
 207. Legal, accounting, filing, and other fees for preparing and filing a registration 
statement with the SEC generally range from $300,000 to $500,000. See GAO REPORT, su-
pra note 22, at 23 tbl.2; John F. Olson & Daniel W. Nelson, What Makes a Company a 
Good Candidate for Going Public? Criteria, Advantages, and Disadvantages Related to Go-
ing Public, in 1 POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 591 (ALI-ABA 1999). 
 208. See, e.g., Raymond Hennessey, IPO Outlook: For IPO Market, More Bad News Is 
Likely for Now, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2000, at C23 (noting that fifteen of the twenty-three 
IPOs scheduled to go effective the previous week were delayed because of market condi-
tions). 
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tion for the company is to seek an additional round of private equity 
capital, mainly, a Rule 506 offering.209 In this scenario, the integra-
tion doctrine comes front and center. If the subsequent private offer-
ing were to be integrated with the failed public offering, the Rule 506 
exemption would not be available since this integrated offering would 
then involve general solicitation (the filing of the registration state-
ment).210  
 The SEC recently passed Rule 155(c) to specifically address this 
scenario.211 Rule 155(c) provides an integration safe harbor for a pri-
vate offering following an abandoned public offering.212 As the SEC 
stated in the adopting release, “[w]e are concerned particularly about 
reducing the capital-raising costs of small businesses and believe 
that adopting Rule 155 will advance that goal significantly.”213 To 
qualify for the Rule 155(c) safe harbor, the following conditions must 
be met: (1) no securities were sold in the public offering; (2) the is-
suer withdrew the public offering registration statement; (3) at least 
thirty days have elapsed between the effective date of the withdrawal 
of the registration statement and the commencement of the private 
offering; and (4) the issuer notifies each offeree in the private place-
ment that (a) the securities are not registered, (b) the securities are 
restricted and may not be resold except if registered or pursuant to 
an exemption, (c) section 11 of the Securities Act does not apply to 
the offering, and (d) the issuer filed and then withdrew a registration 
statement for the public offering and the effective date of the with-
drawal.214 Items (c) and (d) of condition (4) seem to imply that per-
sons solicited in the abandoned public offering, which, by definition, 
involves general solicitation,215 could participate in the private offer-
ing. What is not clear is whether offerees found through the public of-
fering, that is, offerees that had no relationship with the underwriter 
or issuer prior to the public offering, could be included in the private 
offering. 
4.   Rule 504 
 As originally adopted in 1982, investors in a Rule 504 offering 
could not be solicited through general solicitation or advertising, and 
securities issued thereunder were restricted from resale unless “the 
entire offering [was] made exclusively in states that require registra-
tion and the delivery of a disclosure document, and . . . the offering 
                                                                                                                    
 209. New Rule 155, supra note 206. 
 210. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(1), .502(c) (2003). 
 211. Id. § 230.155(c). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Integration of Abandoned Offerings Release, supra note 191, at *4. 
 214. 17 C.F.R. § 230.155(c). 
 215. See supra text accompanying note 206. 
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[was] in compliance with those requirements.”216 In July 1992, the 
SEC amended Rule 504 to eliminate all restrictions on the Rule 504 
exemption and, hence, thereafter an issuer could solicit investors in 
any Rule 504 offering through general solicitation and advertising, 
and the securities issued in such offering would generally be freely 
tradeable.217 The SEC’s reasoning behind the different treatment of 
Rule 504 offerings versus Rule 505 and 506 offerings was that “the 
size and local nature of these small offerings did not appear to war-
rant imposing extensive federal regulation.”218 
 In February 1999, the SEC reversed course and essentially re-
turned to the pre-1992 format with respect to the manner of offering 
and transferability of securities issued under Rule 504.219 Hence, to-
day investors in a Rule 504 offering cannot be solicited through gen-
eral solicitation or advertising, and securities issued thereunder are 
restricted from resale unless the offering is made 
 (i) [e]xclusively in one or more states that provide for the regis-
tration of the securities, and require the public filing and delivery 
to investors of a substantive disclosure document before sale, and 
are made in accordance with those state provisions;  
 (ii) [i]n one or more states that have no provision for the regis-
tration of the securities or the public filing or delivery of a disclo-
sure document before sale, if the securities have been registered in 
at least one state that provides for such registration, public filing 
and delivery before sale, offers and sales are made in that state in 
accordance with such provisions, and the disclosure document is 
delivered before sale to all purchasers (including those in the 
states that have no such procedure); or  
 (iii) [e]xclusively according to state law exemptions from regis-
tration that permit general solicitation and general advertising so 
long as sales are made only to “accredited investors.”220 
 This reversal was in reaction to the use of securities issued in re-
liance on Rule 504 in fraudulent “pump and dump” schemes that 
took advantage of the fact that securities issued under Rule 504 were 
freely tradeable.221 The SEC reasoned that by making securities is-
                                                                                                                    
 216. Regulation D Adopting Release, supra note 79, at *42-*43. 
 217. Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 33-6949, Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-30968, Trust Indenture Act of 1939 Release No. 39-
2287 (July 30, 1992), 1992 SEC LEXIS 1757, at *22-*23 [hereinafter Small Business Ini-
tiatives Release]. 
 218. “Seed Capital” Exemption Release, supra note 83, at *6; see also GAO REPORT, 
supra note 22, at 28 & n.b. 
 219. “Seed Capital” Exemption Release, supra note 83, at *14. 
 220. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1) (2003). 
 221. “Seed Capital” Exemption Release, supra note 83, at *7, *9. The schemes involved 
issuers making prearranged sales of securities under Rule 504 to cohorts in states that do 
not have registration or disclosure requirements. Id. at *9. Unscrupulous broker-dealers 
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sued under Rule 504 generally restricted, “unscrupulous persons 
would be less likely to use the rule as the source of freely tradeable 
securities they need to facilitate their fraudulent transactions.”222 
However, nowhere in the release reinstating the limitations did the 
SEC mention that allowing general solicitation and advertising in 
Rule 504 offerings facilitated or contributed to these fraudulent 
transactions. 
5.   Regulation A 
 The SEC adopted Regulation A in 1936 under section 3(b) of the 
Securities Act and has revised it several times throughout the years, 
most recently in 1992.223 Today, Regulation A provides a conditional 
exemption from registration for offerings of up to $5 million of securi-
ties.224 To qualify for the exemption, a company must prepare and file 
with the SEC an offering statement describing, among other things, 
its business operations, financial conditions, risk factors, and man-
agement.225 The offering statement is typically prepared by the com-
pany’s counsel in conjunction with management and the company’s 
outside accountants. Hence, preparing a Regulation A offering 
statement can cost a small company a significant amount of money 
and management time. 
 In the release adopting the 1992 revisions to Regulation A, the 
SEC noted that 
[o]ne of the major impediments to a Regulation A financing for a 
small start-up or developing company with no established market 
for its securities, is the cost of preparing the mandated offering 
statement. The full costs of compliance would be incurred without 
knowing whether there will be any investor interest in the com-
pany.226 
To address this impediment, the SEC adopted Rule 254,227 which has 
been heralded as an innovative provision.228 Rule 254 allows a com-
                                                                                                                    
would then use cold-calling techniques to “pump” the price of the securities by selling them 
to unsuspecting investors at higher and higher prices. Id. Once all these shares are 
“dumped,” the artificial market demand, and therefore the price of the securities, collapses 
resulting in huge losses to investors. Id. 
 222. Id. at *13. 
 223. 3 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 1341-48. 
 224. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b). 
 225. Id. § 230.253(a); see Form 1-A, Regulation A Offering Statement Under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933,  U.S. Sec. &  Exch. Comm’n,  available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
about/forms/form1-a.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2004). 
 226. Small Business Initiatives Release, supra note 217, at *17-*18. 
 227. 17 C.F.R. § 230.254. 
 228. See, e.g., BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 85, at 419; David T. Mittelman, Note, Test-
ing-the-Waters: How Warm is Regulation A’s Model for Soliciting Investor Interest?, 32 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 233, 241 & n.54 (1998). 
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pany to “test the waters”229 through written communications and 
scripted radio and television broadcasts directed to the general public 
to determine if there is any interest in the offering before spending 
the time and money to undertake a full-blown Regulation A offer-
ing.230  
 The written document or script of the broadcast must include cer-
tain specified statements and information.231 Following filing of the 
written communication or scripted broadcast with the SEC, the com-
pany can engage in oral communications with prospective inves-
tors.232 The company may include, with its written “test-the-waters” 
materials, a coupon whereby a person would indicate her interest in 
the offering by filling in her name, address, and telephone number 
and sending it to the company.233 The company must discontinue use 
of its “test-the-waters” solicitation materials once the company files 
its offering document with the SEC.234 Hence, Regulation A explicitly 
permits general solicitation and general advertising in compliance 
with Rule 254, notwithstanding the fact that Regulation A, like 
Regulation D, provides an exemption from the registration require-
ments of the Securities Act. 
6.   Regulation CE 
 The SEC adopted Regulation CE, a coordinated federal-state ex-
emption from registration, in May 1996 under section 3(b) of the Se-
curities Act.235 Regulation CE is comprised of a single rule, Rule 
1001, which exempts from federal registration “[o]ffers and sales of 
securities that satisfy the conditions of paragraph (n) of section 
25102 of the California Corporations Code.”236 Hence, Rule 1001 in-
                                                                                                                    
 229. Mittelman, supra note 228, at 241. 
 230. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.254. 
 231. Rule 254(b)(2) provides: 
The written document or script of the broadcast shall:  
 (i) State that no money or other consideration is being solicited, and if sent in 
response, will not be accepted;  
 (ii) State that no sales of the securities will be made or commitment to pur-
chase accepted until delivery of an offering circular that includes complete in-
formation about the issuer and the offering;  
 (iii) State that an indication of interest made by a prospective investor in-
volves no obligation or commitment of any kind; and  
 (iv) Identify the chief executive officer of the issuer and . . . in general its 
business and products. 
Id. § 230.254(b)(2). 
 232. Id. § 230.254(a). 
 233. Id. § 230.254(c). 
 234. Id. § 230.254(b)(3). 
 235. Exemption for Certain California Limited Issues, Securities Act of 1933 Release 
No. 33-7285 (May 1, 1996), 1996 SEC LEXIS 1181 [hereinafter California Exemption Re-
lease]. 
 236. 17 C.F.R. § 230.1001. 
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corporates section 25102(n) of the California Corporations Code 
(“California section 25102(n)”) by reference and, therefore, the meat 
of the exemption is found in that section. California Section 25102(n) 
exempts from California blue sky law registration requirements of-
fers and sales of securities to “qualified purchasers.”237 The term 
qualified purchaser is similar, but not identical, to the term accred-
ited investor under Regulation D.238 
 California section 25102(n) permits limited general solicitation 
and, therefore, Rule 1001 does as well.239 Under California section 
25102(n), an issuer can publish a written general announcement of a 
proposed offering so long as it contains only specified information.240 
This general announcement concept is modeled after the “test-the-
                                                                                                                    
 237. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(2) (West 2004). 
 238. California Exemption Release, supra note 235, at *2. The term qualified pur-
chaser  includes:  
designated professional or institutional purchasers or persons affiliated with 
the issuer;  
certain relatives residing with qualified purchasers;  
promoters;  
any person purchasing more than $150,000 of securities in the offering; entities 
whose equity owners are limited to officers, directors and any affiliate of the is-
suer;  
reporting companies under the [Exchange Act] if the transaction involves the 
acquisition of all of an issuer’s capital stock for investment;  
a natural person whose net worth exceeds $500,000, or a natural person whose 
net worth exceeds $250,000 if such purchaser’s annual income exceeds 
$100,000—in either case the transaction must involve:  
 (a) only a one-class voting stock (or preferred establishing the same voting 
rights),  
 (b) an amount limited to no more than 10 percent of the purchaser’s net 
worth, and  
 (c) a purchaser able to protect his or her own interests (alone or with the help 
of a professional advisor); pension and profit sharing trusts, as well as 401(k) 
plans and Individual Retirement Accounts of individual qualified purchasers.  
Id. at *5-*6 (footnotes omitted); see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(2). See supra text ac-
companying notes 94-98 for the Regulation D definition of accredited investor. 
 239. California Exemption Release, supra note 235, at *2. 
 240. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(5)(A). The following information must be included in 
the announcement: “(i) [t]he name of the issuer of the securities[;] (ii) [t]he full title of the 
security to be issued[;] (iii) [t]he anticipated suitability standards for prospective pur-
chaser[;] (iv) [a] statement that” no money is being sought or will be accepted, that an indi-
cation of interest involves no commitment to purchase, and that under certain circum-
stances a disclosure document will be provided prior to purchase; and the name, address 
and telephone number of a person who can provide further information about the offering.  
Id. The announcement may also include any of the following information: 
 (i) [a] brief description of the business of the issuer[;]  
 (ii) [t]he geographic location of the issuer and its business[;] and  
 (iii) [t]he price of the security to be issued, or, if the price is not known, the 
method of its determination or the probable price range as specified by the is-
suer, and the aggregate offering price. 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(5)(B). 
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waters” notion of Regulation A.241 The general announcement may be 
disseminated to persons who are not qualified purchasers,242 but only 
qualified purchasers can be solicited by telephone.243 The issuer must 
also file a notice with the California Corporations Commissioner con-
current with the publication of a general announcement of proposed 
offering or at the time of the initial offer of securities, if earlier.244 
 An exempt offering made in reliance on Rule 1001 is limited by 
Rule 1001(b) to $5 million less the aggregate offering price of any 
other securities sold in the same offering pursuant to a different ex-
emption.245 A more significant limitation, however, is found in Cali-
fornia section 25102(n)(1). That section limits the availability of the 
exemption to: (1) issuers that are business entities organized under 
the laws of California;246 and (2) non-California business entities (a) 
that can attribute more than fifty percent of their property, payroll, 
and sales to California and (b) whose voting securities are held of re-
cord by persons with California addresses.247 Section 25102(n)(1) also 
makes the exemption unavailable to a “blind pool” issuer and an in-
vestment company subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940.248 
Thus, while the SEC designed Regulation CE to “facilitate small 
business[es’] capital raising” ability,249 it can actually only assist the 
capital raising of a small subset of small businesses, mainly those or-
ganized in California or with substantial ties to California. Nonethe-
less, Regulation CE does reflect another example where the SEC de-
termined that an exempt offering that allows at least limited general 
solicitation of potential investors is not inconsistent with investor 
protection.250 
7.   State Exceptions 
 As noted above, offers and sales of securities are also subject to 
state securities laws which require, like federal law, that any offering 
in the state be either registered with the state or exempt from such 
registration.251 The states have various exemptions that correspond 
                                                                                                                    
 241. California Exemption Release, supra note 235, at *8. For a brief overview of Regu-
lation A’s “test-the-waters” provisions, see supra text accompanying notes 232-34. 
 242. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(5)(D). 
 243. Id. § 25102(n)(6). 
 244. Id. § 25102(n)(7). 
 245. 17 C.F.R. § 230.1001(b) (2003). 
 246. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(1). 
 247. Id. §§ 25102(n)(1), 2115; see also California Exemption Release, supra note 235, at 
*4. 
 248. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(1). 
 249. California Exemption Release, supra note 235, at *3. 
 250. See id. at *10 (“The provisions of the California law are consistent with investor 
protection and the public interest, and therefore warrant the Commission’s full exercise of 
its exemptive authority under Section 3(b).”). 
 251. See supra text accompanying note 109. 
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fairly well to the federal Regulation D exemptions.252 Like the Regu-
lation D exemptions, these exemptions generally ban general solici-
tation and general advertising.253 In recent years, however, the North 
America Securities Administration Association (NASAA), an associa-
tion in which the securities administrators of all fifty states are 
members,254 adopted a resolution relating to Internet offers of securi-
ties and a model accredited investor exemption, both of which allow 
general solicitation and advertising.  
 NASAA adopted the Internet resolution in January 1996255 to ad-
dress the emerging practice of companies soliciting investors by post-
ing offering documents on the World Wide Web. Since state bounda-
ries have no impact on the accessibility of a website, such a posting 
raises the issue of whether a company is offering its securities in a 
particular state merely because residents of that state have accessed 
or can access the offering document through the Web. The Uniform 
Securities Act provides that an offer is made in a state, whether or 
not either party is then present in the state, when the offer is di-
rected by the offeror to the state and received at the place to which it 
is directed.256 A state could thus take the position that, since the of-
fering document is accessible to its residents through the Internet, 
the company is directing offers to the state. NASAA passed the 
Internet resolution to resolve this issue. The resolution generally ex-
empts Internet offers from state registration requirements when the 
following criteria are met: (1) The Internet “offer indicate[s] that the 
securities are not being offered to residents of the state; (2) the 
[Internet] offer is not being specifically directed to any persons in the 
state”; and (3) no sales of the company’s securities are made in the 
state as a result of the Internet offer until such time as the securities 
being offered have been registered or an exemption is available.257 As 
of 2003, forty-one states had adopted some form of the resolution.258 
 Hence, a company could theoretically attract an investor from a 
state that has adopted the Internet resolution merely from the inves-
                                                                                                                    
 252. 7A J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 
1933, § 7:277 (2d ed. 2002); see also BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 85, at 1335. 
 253. See, for example, section 402(11) of the Uniform Securities Act, which expressly 
bans general solicitation and advertising, and the NASSA Uniform Limited Offering Ex-
emption, which implicitly bans general solicitation and advertising by exempting offers 
and sales made in compliance with Regulation D. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 85, at 
1370-73. 
 254. See NASAA, Overview, at http://nasaa.org/nasaa/abtnasaa/overview1.asp (last vis-
ited Sept. 28, 2003). 
 255. Resolution Regarding Securities Offered on Internet, NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 7040, 
at 7046 (Jan. 7, 1996). 
 256. Uniform Securities Act § 414(c), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 5554 (NASAA Feb. 
2003). 
 257. Internet: Exemption (for Offers) and BD/IA Advertising, Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
6481, at 2581 (Apr. 2003). 
 258. See id. 
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tor stumbling across the company’s offering documents while surfing 
the Internet. Obviously, in such a case the company would not have 
the requisite preexisting, substantive relationship with the investor 
to demonstrate the absence of general solicitation.259 However, since 
under the Internet resolution locating an investor in the foregoing 
fashion would not be considered an offer in that state, presumably 
the company could still rely on an exemption from that state’s regis-
tration requirements—even if the exemption prohibits general solici-
tation and advertising. 
 NASAA developed the Model Accredited Investor Exemption 
(MAIE) in 1997.260 MAIE exempts from state registration require-
ments sales of securities made exclusively to persons the issuer rea-
sonably believes are accredited investors as defined in Regulation D, 
Rule 501(a), provided the offering meets the other specified condi-
tions of MAIE.261 The exemption is not available to a development-
stage company that has no specific business plan or purpose or its 
business plan is to acquire or merge with unidentified entities.262 Ad-
ditionally, the issuer must reasonably believe that all investors in 
the offering are purchasing for investment purposes and not with a 
view to resale.263 
 Like California Corporate Code section 25102(n), MAIE permits 
general solicitation through a general announcement containing cer-
tain specified information.264 The general announcement may be 
made by any means.265 Further, while MAIE is limited to accredited 
investors, disseminating the general announcement to nonaccredited 
investors does not disqualify the issuer from relying on MAIE.266 
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Unlike California section 25102(n), MAIE does not require that the 
issuer have a connection to the particular state.267 
 According to the SEC, as of December 2001, forty states had 
adopted MAIE or a similar provision exempting from state registra-
tion offerings to accredited investors.268 Hence, by adopting MAIE, at 
least forty states have presumably recognized that an exempt offer-
ing that allows at least limited general solicitation of potential inves-
tors is not inconsistent with investor protection. As discussed below, 
however, MAIE is not very useful to companies seeking private eq-
uity capital because there is no corresponding federal exemption.269 
8.   Breadth of Exceptions 
 In my opinion, the above federal and state measures to soften the 
ban on general solicitation and advertising do not go far enough. The 
federal measures are narrow. Rule 135c is generally only available to 
a company that has completed an initial public offering.270 Rule 135e 
is available only to foreign private issuers.271 While the SEC enacted 
Rule 155(c) specifically with small business capital raising in mind, 
Rule 155(c) only addresses a narrow set of circumstances, that is, a 
company seeking private equity following a failed public offering.272 
Hence, Rule 155(c) provides no relief from the ban on general solici-
tation and advertising for an emerging company seeking early 
rounds of private equity. Rule 504 allows general solicitation and ad-
vertising only in narrow circumstances and is limited to offerings of 
$1 million or less.273 The Regulation A, Rule 254 “test-the-waters” 
provision, at first blush, supplies some relief because it does allow a 
company to engage in limited general solicitation and advertising 
during any stage of fundraising.274 However, the states have essen-
tially nullified Rule 254 and, thus, in reality, it is of little use.275 
                                                                                                                    
 (i) sales will only be made to accredited investors;  
 (ii) no money or other consideration is being solicited or will be accepted by 
way of this general announcement; and  
 (iii) the securities have not been registered with or approved by any state se-
curities agency of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and are being 
offered and sold pursuant to an exemption from registration. 
Id. ¶ 361(E)(2). 
 267. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 85, at 1368-69. 
 268. Defining the Term “Qualified Purchaser” Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securi-
ties Act of 1933 Release No 33-8041 (Dec. 19, 2001), 2001 SEC LEXIS 2620, at *27 [herein-
after “Qualified Purchaser” Release]. 
 269. See infra text accompanying notes 371-72. 
 270. See supra Part III.D.1. 
 271. See supra Part III.D.2. 
 272. See supra Part III.D.3. 
 273. See supra Part III.D.4. 
 274. See supra Part III.D.5. 
 275. See infra text accompanying notes 360-62. 
2004]                          RELAXING THE BAN 33 
 
Regulation CE does provide some relief since it allows a form of gen-
eral solicitation and advertising.276 However, this relief is of little 
help to the majority of emerging companies because Regulation CE is 
available only to those companies organized in California or with 
substantial ties to California.277 Finally, at the state level, NASAA’s 
adoption of the Internet resolution and the MAIE are encouraging.278 
However, as things stand today, they are of little use to an emerging 
company seeking private equity since they do not complement Rule 
506, the key federal exemption. Hence the encouragement comes 
from an inference that can be drawn from NASAA’s adoption, that is, 
a recognition by the states that the ban on general solicitation and 
advertising should be softened. 
 Again, common sense dictates that the key to selling a product is 
marketing. Take a company like Callaway Golf Co., the world’s larg-
est manufacturer of premium golf clubs.279 Callaway Golf was a one-
time emerging company seeking to revolutionize the golf club indus-
try through radical new club designs.280 One logical approach for a 
company like Callaway Golf to raise early-stage private equity capi-
tal would be to contact individuals who are likely to be wealthy and 
have an interest in the company’s story. For a manufacturer of pre-
mium golf clubs, a starting point could be targeted marketing to all 
professional golfers and members of high-end country clubs.281 How-
ever, the SEC has made it clear that, absent a preexisting, substan-
tive relationship with all those targeted, such marketing would con-
stitute general solicitation and advertising.282  
 This point is demonstrated by the 1982 Aspen Grove no-action let-
ter.283 Aspen Grove was a limited partnership engaged in a thor-
oughbred racehorse boarding, training, and breeding business.284 As-
pen Grove proposed distributing marketing materials for the sale of 
its limited partnership interests.285 Aspen Grove intended to mail a 
brochure to members of the “Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders As-
sociation” in the states of Illinois, Louisiana, and Texas.286 The bro-
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chure would also be distributed at a fall horse sale in Lexington, 
Kentucky.287 Finally, the brochure information would be reprinted in 
The Blood-Horse, a trade journal read by racehorse enthusiasts.288 
Hence, Aspen Grove was attempting to specifically target its market-
ing materials in mediums that would reach people with an interest in 
Aspen Grove’s business. The SEC, however, declined to find that 
these marketing methods would not involve general solicitation or 
advertising.289 
 Likewise, in In re Kenman Corp.,290 Kenman Securities, a regis-
tered broker-dealer, engaged in targeted marketing with respect to 
two offerings of limited partnership interests in real estate ventures 
in reliance on Rule 506.291 Specifically, Kenman mailed information 
concerning the offerings to an unknown number of people comprised 
of persons who had participated in prior Kenman offerings, executive 
officers at Fortune 500 companies, persons who had previously in-
vested $10,000 or more in real estate offerings, California physicians, 
Hughes Aircraft managerial engineers, and presidents of New Jersey 
industrial companies.292 The SEC noted that the makeup of the group 
“may indicate that the persons themselves have some degree of in-
vestment sophistication or financial well-being,”293 and one suspects 
that is exactly why Kenman targeted them. However, because Ken-
man did not have the requisite preexisting, substantive relationship 
with each offeree, the SEC concluded that Kenman engaged in gen-
eral solicitation, and therefore the offerings were not exempt from 
registration.294 
IV.   IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR THE PROHIBITION ON GENERAL 
SOLICITATION AND ADVERTISING 
 Given the importance of emerging companies to the economy and 
the critical role private equity financing plays in their emergence, 
one would assume that the prohibition on general solicitation and 
advertising would have a strong ideological foundation. I submit that 
it does not. The ban is simply the product of the historic statutory 
basis of the private placement exemptions entrenched by the over-
lapping federal and state regulation of securities offerings. 
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A.   Statutory Basis of Private Placement Exemptions 
 The original private placement exemption, enacted by Congress in 
1933, is today found in section 4(2) of the Securities Act.295 Section 
4(2) exempts from registration with the SEC “transactions by an is-
suer not involving any public offering.”296 Thus, the availability of the 
section 4(2) exemption turns on the definition of public offering. How-
ever, neither the Securities Act nor the rules promulgated there-
under define the term.297 The legislative history provides little guid-
ance other than the broad statements that the exemption applies to 
transactions “where there is no practical need for [the Securities 
Act’s] application or where the public benefits are too remote,” and 
that “a specific or an isolated sale of its securities” would fall within 
the exemption.298  
 The SEC has provided further guidance. In a 1935 release, it 
stated that “the determination of what constitutes a public offering is 
essentially a question of fact, in which all surrounding circumstances 
are of moment. In no sense is the question to be determined exclu-
sively by the number of prospective offerees.”299 The release goes on 
to state that the principal factors to be considered in determining the 
availability of the exemption are the following: “1. The number of of-
ferees and their relationship to each other and to the issuer; 2. The 
number of units offered; 3. The size of the offering; and 4. The man-
ner of the offering.”300  
 The Supreme Court weighed in on the scope of section 4(2) when 
it decided SEC v. Ralston Purina Co. in 1953.301 The case involved 
annual offerings by Ralston Purina, a manufacturer and distributor 
of feed and cereal products, of its common stock to select employ-
ees.302 In some years, over 400 employees, including those in various 
low-level positions, purchased the company’s stock.303 At issue in the 
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case was whether these offerings fell within the exemption.304 The 
lower court found that these offerings did fall within section 4(2), 
reasoning that “the intra-organizational offerings of stock by [Ral-
ston Purina], unaccompanied by any solicitation, which have resulted 
in a limited distribution of stock, for investment purposes, to a select 
group of employees considered by the management to be worthy of 
retention and probable future promotion” did not involve a public of-
fering.305 The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that “the applica-
bility of [section 4(2)] should turn on whether the particular class of 
persons affected needs the protection of the [Securities] Act. An offer-
ing to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a 
transaction ‘not involving any public offering.’”306 The Court went on 
to state that in analyzing the availability of the exemption, “[t]he fo-
cus of inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the protections 
afforded by registration. The employees here were not shown to have 
access to the kind of information which registration would dis-
close.”307 The Court did not, however, go as far as the SEC had urged, 
rejecting the SEC’s argument that “‘an offering to a substantial 
number of the public’ is not exempt under [section 4(2)].”308 Although 
the Court noted that “[i]t may well be that offerings to a substantial 
number of persons would rarely be exempt,”309 it refused to “super-
impos[e] a quantity limit on private offerings as a matter of statutory 
interpretation.”310 Nonetheless, it did state that “nothing prevents 
the [SEC], in enforcing the statute, from using some kind of numeri-
cal test in deciding when to investigate particular exemption 
claims.”311 
 Thus, while the Court rejected a numerical cap on the number of 
offerees for a private offering, it appeared to invite the SEC to adopt 
a numerical floor on the number of offerees, below which an offering 
would be deemed private.312 Consequently, shortly after Ralston Pu-
rina, the SEC adopted a rule of thumb that an offering to no more 
than twenty-five offerees falls within the section 4(2) exemption.313 
 This rule of thumb was short lived. After 1958, “the number of 
[SEC] disavowals of any safe numerical test grew to the point that no 
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one could any longer assume as a practical matter that an offering to 
no more than some 25 persons (or any lesser number) would be con-
sidered exempt by the [SEC].”314 In fact, in 1973, the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that a sale of a large block of stock by one individual to an-
other individual was not a transaction not involving a public offer-
ing.315 The court reasoned that “[t]here was no evidence . . . of what 
knowledge [the buyer] possessed concerning either the stock or the 
company, nor was he shown to be in a position to know such informa-
tion as would have been disclosed by registration.”316 With no objec-
tive numerical safe harbor, issuers, their counsel, and the courts 
were left to apply the subjective “needs” and “access” tests estab-
lished by Ralston Purina.317 Some courts emphasized the relationship 
between the issuer and the purchasers,318 some focused on the so-
phistication of the purchasers,319 and some stressed the type of dis-
closure made to purchasers and the number of offerees.320 One attor-
ney categorized the resulting section 4(2) jurisprudence as 
a kind of mishmash. The issuer is now told that all of these factors 
have something to do with whether he has an exemption under 
Section 4(2), but he is never given a hint as to the proper propor-
tions in the brew. The saving recipe is kept secret, a moving target 
which he can never be sure he has hit.321 
 The SEC attempted to clean up the mishmash in 1974 when it 
adopted Rule 146.322 Rule 146 was “designed to provide more objec-
tive standards for determining when offers or sales of securities by 
an issuer would be deemed to be transactions nt [sic] involving any 
public offering within the meaning of Section 4(2) of the [Securities] 
Act.”323 Under Rule 146, offers or sales of securities by the issuer 
were deemed to fall within section 4(2) if four conditions were met. 
First, no offers could be made by means of any form of general solici-
tation or general advertising.324 Second, immediately prior to making 
any offer, the issuer must have had reasonable grounds to believe 
and must have believed that the offeree had sufficient knowledge to 
evaluate the merits and risks of the investment or would be able to 
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bear the economic risk of the investment.325 Third, immediately prior 
to making any sale, the issuer must have had reasonable grounds to 
believe and must have believed, after making reasonable inquiry, 
that the purchaser had sufficient knowledge to evaluate the merits 
and risks of the investment or that the purchaser, with his represen-
tative, had sufficient knowledge to evaluate the merits and risks of 
the investment and would be able to bear the economic risk of the in-
vestment.326 Fourth, each offeree must have had access to or been 
furnished specified information about the issuer.327 While there was 
no dollar limitation on the size of an offering in reliance on Rule 146, 
the number of purchasers was limited to thirty-five, but a person 
who purchased or agreed to purchase $150,000 or more of securities 
in the offering would not be counted.328 
 Rule 146 was not well received.329 “Compliance with the rule was 
described as unduly complex, costly, and subjective, with an unac-
ceptable level of risk that the exemption may be lost inadver-
tently.”330 In fact, a House advisory committee report characterized 
the rule as a failure and called for its repeal.331 
 In partial response to this criticism, the SEC promulgated two 
additional exemptions, Rule 240 and Rule 242, under section 3(b) of 
the Securities Act.332 Section 3(b) empowers the SEC to adopt rules 
exempting offerings of securities up to $5 million333 “if it finds that 
the enforcement of . . . [the Securities Act] is not necessary in the 
public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the 
small amount involved or the limited character of the public offer-
ing.”334 Rule 240, adopted in 1975, allowed an issuer to sell up to 
$100,000 of securities in any twelve-month period without registra-
tion under the Securities Act so long as investors were not solicited 
through general advertising and the issuer did not pay commission 
or similar remuneration for soliciting investors.335 Additionally, both 
before and after an offering relying on Rule 240, there must have 
been one hundred or fewer beneficial owners of the issuer’s securi-
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ties.336 Rule 240, however, did not require that investors be furnished 
with or given access to any information about the issuer.337 
 Recognizing that Rule 240 was of limited utility to small busi-
nesses, in 1980 the SEC adopted Rule 242.338 Rule 242 allowed an is-
suer to sell up to $2 million of securities in any six-month period to 
an unlimited number of “accredited persons” and up to thirty-five 
other purchasers.339 Accredited person was defined as certain speci-
fied institutional investors, purchasers of $100,000 or more of securi-
ties in the offering, and executive officers and directors of the is-
suer.340 If the issuer made sales only to accredited purchasers, there 
were no information requirements.341 If nonaccredited purchasers 
were included in the offering, Rule 242 required that certain infor-
mation about the issuer be furnished to all investors.342 Rule 242 
prohibited an issuer from soliciting investors through general adver-
tising.343 
 Less than two years after adopting Rule 240 and in the wake of 
various congressional and SEC hearings,344 which resulted in the 
adoption of the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980,345 
the SEC proposed and, seven months later, adopted Regulation D, 
the current principal exemption regime for offerings by small busi-
nesses, as discussed above.346 The intent of Regulation D was to cre-
ate “a more coherent pattern of exemptive relief, particularly as it re-
late[d] to the capital formation needs of small business.”347 Specifi-
cally, Regulation D significantly revised Rules 146, 240, and 242 and 
consolidated them into one regulation—with common definitions, 
terms, and conditions—in an effort to simplify the then-existing ex-
emptive scheme that many viewed as unnecessarily complex.348 As 
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noted above, the exemptions are contained in Rules 504, 505, and 
506, all of which replaced the exemptions provided by Rules 240, 242, 
and 146, respectively.349  
 As discussed above, Regulation D also retained the prohibition 
against general solicitation and general advertising included in Rule 
240 and interpreted it in accordance with Ralston Purina.350 This is 
not surprising since Rule 504 and Rule 505 were promulgated under 
section 3(b) of the Securities Act,351 and Rule 506 was promulgated 
under section 4(2) of the Securities Act.352 Section 3(b) provides that 
the SEC can exempt offerings of up to $5 million if a small amount is 
involved (Rule 504), or the offering is of limited character (Rule 
505).353 Section 4(2) exempts transactions by an issuer not involving a 
public offering.354 General solicitation and general advertising are in-
consistent with (1) an offering of limited character and (2) an offering 
not involving a public offering. As the SEC has stated, “we have long 
construed general solicitation or advertising to impart a public char-
acter to an offering.”355 Consequently, in the SEC’s view “[t]he prohi-
bition on general solicitation and advertising is what keeps the offer-
ing ‘private.’”356 
B.   Overlapping Federal and State Securities Regulations 
 Recall that offers and sales of securities are subject to regulation 
at both the federal and state level. As noted above, all but one state 
requires that offers and sales of securities be registered with state 
regulators unless the offering falls within an exemption.357 Thus, 
prior to the enactment of NSMIA in 1996, a company undertaking a 
private offering had to structure the offering so that it fit within a 
federal exemption, mainly, Regulation D, and an exemption for each 
state in which the company intended to offer the securities.358 This 
was possible to do, even if the company contemplated seeking inves-
tors in numerous states, because all states generally have exemp-
tions that complement the Regulation D exemptions; hence, if an of-
fering was exempt at the federal level under Regulation D, it was 
typically exempt at the state level.359 However, for example, if the 
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SEC had decided prior to 1996 to eliminate Regulation D’s ban on 
general solicitation and advertising, the states would likewise have 
had to lift the ban with respect to their corresponding exemptions in 
order for this federal change to have had any effect. Completely lift-
ing the ban with respect to United States jurisdiction would have re-
quired each of the fifty states and Guam, Puerto Rico, and Washing-
ton, D.C., to change their securities laws. 
 This point is poignantly exemplified by the states’ reaction to Rule 
254 “test-the-waters” provisions of Regulation A, adopted by the SEC 
in 1992.360 As noted above, Rule 254 explicitly permits a limited form 
of general solicitation and advertising notwithstanding the fact that 
Regulation A is an exemption from the registration requirements of 
the Securities Act. Many state administrators viewed Rule 254 as 
contrary to investor protection.361 Hence, state laws generally were 
not modified to coordinate with Rule 254, ultimately nullifying Rule 
254.362  
 On the flip side, if one or more states changed its securities laws 
to allow general solicitation and advertising in an exempt offering, 
the SEC would need to make a corresponding change to the federal 
exemptions. This, in fact, is what happened with section 25102(n) of 
the California Corporations Code,363 enacted by California in 1994.364 
Recall that California section 25102(n) provides an exemption from 
California’s registration requirements but allows limited general so-
licitation and advertising.365 However, if a company engaged in such 
solicitation, neither a Rule 505 nor a Rule 506 exemption from fed-
eral registration would be available.366 As discussed above, the SEC 
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it “recognizes the policy objectives underlying the testing-the-waters exemption . . . , but 
has substantial concerns as to whether it can adequately ensure that investors are pro-
tected.” Resolution of the NASAA Regarding Testing-the-Waters Exemption, NASAA Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 7036, at 7043 (Apr. 25, 1993); see also NASAA Comment Letter to SEC Secretary, 
Jonathan Katz, Regarding SEC Release Nos. 33-6950, 34-30969, 39-2288; Additional Small 
Business Initiatives, [1986-1993 New Developments] NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 9349, at 9390 
(Oct. 5, 1992) (describing testing-the-waters concept as short-sighted and unwise).  
 362. Steinberg, supra note 361, at 411. The states’ response to Rule 254 is in contrast 
to the states’ response to MAIE, which as of December 2001 had been adopted by forty 
states. Perhaps this is because offerings in reliance on MAIE are limited to accredited in-
vestors while Regulation A offerings are open to all investors. Further, MAIE was champi-
oned by NASAA while Rule 254 was championed by the SEC, and some perceived Rule 254 
as politically motivated. Id. at 410-11. A few states did change their securities laws to al-
low testing-the-waters. See Mittelman, supra note 228, at 251. 
 363. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n) (West 2004). 
 364. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 85, at 1372-73. 
 365. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 366. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 85, at 1372-73. 
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adopted Regulation CE in 1996 to provide a federal exemption spe-
cifically for a California section 25102(n) offering.367 
 In adopting Regulation CE, the SEC stated that it would create an 
exemption for any state that adopts an “exemption incorporating the 
same standards used by California.”368 In response to this invita-
tion,369 NASAA developed the Model Accredited Investor Exemption 
(MAIE) discussed above.370 Notwithstanding its statements in adopt-
ing Regulation CE, the SEC has not adopted a corresponding federal 
exemption for MAIE.371 Perhaps this is because MAIE lacks a state 
connection requirement and therefore does not “incorporat[e] the 
same standards used by California.”372 Regardless, the SEC’s failure 
to adopt an exemption corresponding to MAIE provides another ex-
ample of the nullifying effect of overlapping federal and state securi-
ties regulation. 
C.   Securities Fraud Prevention 
 One could also argue that the ban on general solicitation and ad-
vertising is justified because it helps prevent securities fraud.373 Spe-
cifically, the prohibition makes it more difficult for promoters of 
fraudulent investment schemes to attract investors.374 While the ban 
may not deter such promoters from using all forms of public advertis-
ing, it likely curtails their activities; that is, if their solicitation ac-
tivities are too public, they will attract the attention of the SEC or 
state regulators.  
 According to an SEC official, “[t]he prohibition on general solicita-
tion . . . helps minimize the risks of widespread fraud.”375 The forego-
ing, however, has not been cited in the historical development of the 
ban as an ideological basis. Regardless, such a basis is subject to at-
tack because the remedy is overbroad. While the ban may help pre-
vent securities fraud, it has a much greater impact on the ability of 
an honest, legitimate company to attract investors since, in light of 
the ban, such a company will not engage in any general solicitation 
or advertising, whereas someone willing to perpetrate securities 
fraud likely is not troubled in the least by violating the ban. 
                                                                                                                    
 367. See supra notes 235 and 238 and accompanying text; see also BLOOMENTHAL, su-
pra note 85, at 1372-73. 
 368. California Exemption Release, supra note 235, at *13. 
 369. Borg Letter, supra note 260. 
 370. See supra text accompanying notes 260-67. 
 371. Borg Letter, supra note 260, at 9-10. 
 372. See supra note 368 and accompanying text. 
 373. See HICKS, supra note 252, § 7:160. 
 374. Id. 
 375. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 30. 
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V.   PROPOSED REGULATORY REFORM 
 With the enactment of NSMIA in 1996, there is now clear statu-
tory authority under which the SEC could adopt rules allowing gen-
eral solicitation and advertising in exempt offerings without these 
rules being subject to state nullification. Specifically, NSMIA added 
section 28 to the Securities Act: 
The [SEC], by rule or regulation, may conditionally or uncondi-
tionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class 
or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provi-
sion or provisions of this subchapter or of any rule or regulation is-
sued under this subchapter, to the extent that such exemption is 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent 
with the protection of investors.376 
Thus, section 28 provides the SEC with general exemptive authority 
similar to that provided by section 3(b) of the Securities Act377 but 
with no monetary limit or references to offerings of limited amount or 
character. Hence, there is no need that an exemption adopted under 
section 28 be consistent with the public/private distinction jurispru-
dence of the existing exemptions.378 
 NSMIA also added subsection (b) to section 2 of the Securities Act: 
Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the [SEC] is engaged in 
rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an 
action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the [SEC] 
shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, 
whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capi-
tal formation.379 
Hence, the SEC could adopt an exemption under section 28 that al-
lows general solicitation and advertising so long as the exemption is 
(1) necessary or appropriate in the public interest and (2) consistent 
with investor protection.380 In making the first determination, Con-
gress has specifically directed the SEC to consider capital formation. 
 As mentioned above, NSMIA also amended section 18 of the Secu-
rities Act to provide that states may not directly or indirectly require 
registration of offerings involving “covered securit[ies].”381 This re-
sulted in the preemption of state registration requirements for ex-
                                                                                                                    
 376. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2000). 
 377. See supra text accompanying notes 332-34. 
 378. Hence, the assertion by an SEC official that “[t]he prohibition on general solicita-
tion and advertising is what keeps the offering ‘private’” is now irrelevant. GAO REPORT, 
supra note 22, at 30. 
 379. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (emphasis added). 
 380. See Securities Uniformity; Annual Conference on Uniformity of Securities Laws, 
Release No. 33-7413 (Apr. 4, 1997), 1997 SEC LEXIS 747, at *3. 
 381. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 
102(a), 110 Stat. 3417 (1996); 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a). 
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empt offerings of covered securities.382 Section 18 defines a covered 
security as a security listed or approved for listing on the New York 
Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange, a security admit-
ted or approved for admission and trading on the Nasdaq National 
Market,383 and, as mentioned above, a security issued pursuant to 
Rule 506.384 Section 18 also provides that “[a] security is a covered se-
curity with respect to the offer or sale of the security to qualified pur-
chasers, as defined by the [SEC] by rule.”385 Therefore, the SEC could 
adopt a new private placement exemption under section 28 that al-
lows general solicitation and advertising without the exemption be-
ing subject to state nullification. The SEC could achieve this by in-
cluding within the definition of qualified purchaser all offerees and 
purchasers of securities pursuant to this new exemption. This, in 
turn, would bring securities issued under this new exemption within 
the definition of covered security, resulting in the preemption of state 
registration requirements for an offering under this new exemp-
tion.386 
 Since enactment, the SEC has on four occasions adopted rules in 
reliance on section 28.387 For example, in December 2002, the SEC re-
lied on section 28 in adopting Rule 238 under the Securities Act.388 
Rule 238 exempts certain standardized options from all requirements 
of the Securities Act other than the anti-fraud provisions.389 Addi-
tionally, in December 2001, the SEC proposed a definition of quali-
fied purchaser for purposes of the definition of a covered security un-
der section 18 of the Securities Act that mirrors the definition of ac-
credited investor under Regulation D.390 To date, the SEC has not 
acted on its proposal. 
                                                                                                                    
 382. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemp-
tion Failure, 22 J. CORP. L. 175, 196-97 (1997). 
 383. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A). 
 384. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
 385. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3). 
 386. See Campbell, supra note 382, at 207. 
 387. See Amendments to Investment Company Advertising Rules, Securities Act of 
1933 Release No. 33-8294, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-48558, Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 Release No. IC-26195 (Sept. 29, 2003), 2003 SEC LEXIS 2315, 
at *11 n.15; Exemption for Standardized Options from Provisions of the Securities Act of 
1933 and from the Registration Requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Se-
curities Act of 1933 Release No. 33-8171, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-
47082 (Dec. 23, 2002), 2002 SEC LEXIS 3298, at *11-*12 [hereinafter Offshore Press Ac-
tivities Release]; Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder Communications, Securities 
Act of 1933 Release No. 33-7760, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-42055, Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 Release No. IC-24107 (Oct. 22, 1999), 1999 SEC LEXIS 2291, 
at *33-*34 n.47; Rule 701—Exempt Offerings Pursuant to Compensatory Arrangements, 
Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 33-7645 (Feb. 25, 1999), 1999 SEC LEXIS 406, at *7-*8. 
 388. Offshore Press Activities Release, supra note 387. 
 389. 17 C.F.R. § 230.238 (2003). 
 390. “Qualified Purchaser” Release, supra note 268, at *1. 
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 While with the enactment of NSMIA the SEC has the power to al-
low general solicitation and advertising in private placements, the 
question is whether it should exercise this power. Given the impor-
tance of emerging companies to the United States economy and the 
critical role access to private equity capital plays in the development 
of emerging companies, I believe the SEC should, under certain cir-
cumstances, allow general solicitation and advertising in private 
placements.391 Hence, below is a description of a proposed new ex-
emption I urge the SEC to adopt.  
 Recognizing that the current ban on general solicitation and ad-
vertising may aid in battling securities fraud, my proposal does not 
call for blanket elimination but, rather, it calls for an exemption tar-
geted specifically for emerging companies. First, the SEC should 
adopt a new federal exemption similar to Regulation CE392 but with-
out requiring a California connection393 for offers and sales of securi-
ties to accredited investors as defined in Regulation D. Like Regula-
tion CE, the exemption would allow general solicitation and advertis-
ing,394 but unlike Regulation CE, it would not restrict the content of 
the solicitation, only the method.395 In particular, general solicitation 
and advertising would be allowed, but only through (1) broker-
dealers registered with both the SEC and the states in which solici-
tation is directed396 and (2) certain company personnel.397 These limi-
                                                                                                                    
 391. My position would likely have the support of the Subcommittee on Small Business 
Issuers of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities and members of the Small 
Business Committee of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association. See 
Letter from Stanely Keller et al., Chair, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, to 
SEC (Apr. 30, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72301/keller1.htm (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2004). Additionally, NASAA has recently stated that “we believe small issuers 
would be better served by adopting a federal exemption in the spirit of Rule 1001 [of the 
Securities Act] that would make public solicitation of accredited investors more available.” 
Borg Letter, supra note 260, at 9; see also U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Final Report of the 
21st Annual SEC Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation, at 
15 (Feb. 2003) (“The restrictions on the use of general solicitations to make offers and sales 
under Rule 506 to accredited investors should be eliminated.”); GAO REPORT, supra note 
22, at 30 (“It has been suggested by such [industry] participants that SEC eliminate the 
restriction on advertising and general solicitation . . . .”); MOLLER, supra note 31, at 7 (“A 
change in the law allowing general solicitation of the offering (without restrictions) would 
allow issuers to reach accredited investors more easily.”); Langevoort, supra note 136, at 25 
(“On balance, I would be willing to deregulate in the area of general solicitations. Any form 
of general solicitation should be permissible so long as the offering is made available only 
to accredited investors.”). 
 392. See supra Part III.D.6. 
 393. See supra Part III.D.6. 
 394. See supra text accompanying note 240. 
 395. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 396. At the federal level, the Exchange Act generally requires the registration of all 
broker-dealers with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (2000). Likewise, all states require the 
registration of broker-dealers. 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 69. The term broker-
dealer is defined generally as “any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions 
in securities for the account of others.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (West Supp. 2004); Uniform 
Securities Act § 401(c), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 5541 (Nov. 2000). A brokerage house of 
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tations would, for example, prevent a company from hiring a tele-
marketing firm to engage in widespread telephone solicitation of po-
tential investors, whose activities may give rise to investor protection 
concerns.  
 As for company personnel, the exemption would permit only those 
personnel that fall within the Exchange Act Rule 240.3a4-1, a safe 
harbor for avoiding federal broker-dealer registration requirements, 
to engage in general solicitation or advertising.398 The safe harbor is 
limited to “associated person[s] of an issuer,” which is defined as offi-
cers, directors, and employees of the issuer or persons controlling the 
issuer.399 To fall within the safe harbor in the emerging company con-
text, the associated person would need to meet each of the following 
six conditions. First, the person cannot have been barred from asso-
ciating with a member of a self-regulatory organization, that is, a 
brokerage house.400 Second, the person must not be a partner, officer, 
director, or employee of a broker or dealer.401 Third, the person can-
not be paid a commission or other remuneration based on sales of se-
                                                                                                                    
any size will be registered with the SEC and all fifty states. Registration generally involves 
completing and filing Form BD, a uniform application for broker-dealer registration, with 
the SEC and each state in which registration is desired. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra 
note 65, at 89. Form BD includes questions going to the applicant’s fitness. See Uniform 
Application for Broker-Dealer Registration, FORM BD. Registration with the SEC triggers 
numerous compliance requirements which, among other things, seek to insure basic com-
petency of registered broker-dealers. 1 DAVID A. LIPTON, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION § 
1.3, at 13 (2004). Both the SEC and the States may deny, suspend, or revoke registration 
for various reasons. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(1), (4). 
 397. As mentioned above, under the current regulatory scheme, in order to complete a 
successful private placement, it is critical that an emerging company retain an investment 
banking firm so that the company has access to the firm’s pool of accredited investors. See 
Langevoort, supra note 136, at 13. Allowing company personnel to solicit potential inves-
tors would make this access less critical since investors in the offering would no longer be 
limited to those with whom the company or the investment banking firm has a preexisting, 
substantive relationship. This would allow a company to avoid paying a commission, and, 
perhaps more importantly, it would allow an emerging company that is unable to attract 
an investment banking firm to raise money for it a greater chance of succeeding on its own. 
In practice, though, raising private equity capital without the aid of an investment bank-
ing firm is difficult. Not only do investment banking firms have established pools of inves-
tors interested in investing in emerging companies, but they also provide expert assistance 
in pricing, structuring, and selling the deal. Id. Most importantly, they signal to potential 
investors the information credibility of the company. Id. at 14; see also Ronald J. Gilson & 
Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 620 (1984) 
(“In essence, the investment banker rents the [company] its reputation. The investment 
banker represents to the market . . . that it has evaluated the [company]’s product and 
good faith and that it is prepared to stake its reputation on the value of the innovation.”). 
From an investor’s perspective, investing in an emerging company is laden with high 
transaction costs such as uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs. Gilson, 
supra note 2, at 1069. In light of these costs, having an investment banking firm involved 
may be critical to tipping the scale in favor of investing. 
 398. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1 (2003). 
 399. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a), (c)(1). 
 400. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(1). 
 401. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(3). 
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curities.402 Fourth, the person must primarily perform substantial 
duties for the company other than selling its securities.403 Fifth, the 
person cannot have been a broker-dealer or associated person of a 
broker-dealer during the preceding twelve months.404 Sixth, the per-
son cannot have (with certain limited exceptions) participated in the 
sale of securities of any company during the preceding twelve 
months.405  
 The new exemption would not limit general solicitation and ad-
vertising to accredited investors, although only accredited investors 
could invest in the offering. This would allow a company and its bro-
ker-dealer to use a full range of marketing techniques tailored for a 
particular deal to reach the coveted pool of potential or latent angel 
investors406—the people most willing to provide emerging companies 
with vital start-up and early-stage equity financing.407 It would allow 
a company like Callaway Golf to target, on its own or through an in-
vestment banking firm, all professional golfers, members of high-end 
country clubs, and anyone else regardless of a lack of preexisting, 
substantive relationships with these individuals. 
 The exemption would provide that all written solicitation materi-
als would need to include a legend specifying the name of the com-
pany representative or registered broker-dealer making the solicita-
tion and that only accredited investors can participate in the offering. 
Further, no telephone solicitation would be permitted unless, prior to 
the solicitation, the solicitor reasonably believes that the prospective 
investor is accredited. Additionally, the exemption would require 
that the issuer reasonably believes all investors are purchasing for 
investment and not with a view toward resale. Further, the exemp-
tion would be unavailable to an issuer if the issuer, its directors, offi-
cers, or ten percent or greater shareholders have committed certain 
conduct in violation of federal or state securities laws.408 
 This new exemption would meet the standards required by section 
28. The exemption is necessary and appropriate in the public interest 
because it would greatly facilitate early-stage capital raising by 
emerging companies, the growth engines of the United States econ-
omy. The exemption is also consistent with investor protection since 
it is limited to offerings sold only to accredited investors. As the SEC 
recently noted, “our considerable regulatory experience with the use 
of the term ‘accredited investor’ leads us to believe it strikes the ap-
                                                                                                                    
 402. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(2). 
 403. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(ii)(A). 
 404. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(ii)(B). 
 405. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(ii)(C). 
 406. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
 407. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
 408. Cf. Model Accredited Investor Exemption, [Feb. 1999] NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
361(C), (D) (Apr. 27, 1997); 17 C.F.R. § 230.507 (2003). 
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propriate balance between the necessity for investor protection and 
meaningful relief for issuers offering securities, especially small 
businesses.”409 
 Additionally, the new exemption would be similar to Rule 506, a 
rule promulgated over thirty years ago that, to date, has not raised 
significant investor protection concerns. Like Rule 506, the new ex-
emption would have no limit on the size of the offering or number of 
accredited investors participating. Unlike Rule 506, the new exemp-
tion would allow general solicitation and advertising. As discussed 
above, however, the ban on general solicitation and advertising ap-
plicable to Rule 506 is not the result of investor protection concerns 
but the result of the public versus private offering distinction con-
tained in the Securities Act, a distinction not relevant to an exemp-
tion adopted under section 28. Therefore, if Rule 506 passes investor 
protection muster, it follows that the new exemption would pass in-
vestor protection muster as well. 
 In connection with adopting the new exemption, the SEC should 
either adopt its proposal to define qualified purchaser to mirror ac-
credited investor under Regulation D410 or, as suggested above, adopt 
a proposal to include within the definition of qualified purchaser all 
offerees and purchasers of securities pursuant to this new exemption. 
Either approach would have the effect of preempting state securities 
regulations with respect to offers and sales of securities in reliance 
on this new exemption, thereby making it impossible for states to es-
sentially nullify the exemption by failing to adopt parallel state ex-
emptions.411 
 NASAA and the securities regulators of several states have re-
cently expressed displeasure with this preemption approach.412 In a 
                                                                                                                    
 409. “Qualified Purchaser” Release, supra note 268, at *9. Note that this article takes 
no position on the appropriateness today of the current definition of accredited investor, 
which was established by the SEC in 1979. Id. at *11. The definition has been criticized 
for, among other things, being based on dollar amounts that have never been adjusted for 
inflation. See Borg Letter, supra note 260, at 2. My position is that if the SEC views the 
current definition as an adequate objective proxy for delineating those investors that have 
the necessary financial sophistication and ability to fend for themselves so as “not [to] re-
quire the protections of registration under the federal securities laws,” “Qualified Pur-
chaser” Release, supra note 268, at *12, for purposes of Regulation D, then it is adequate 
for purposes of my proposed exemption as well. 
 410. See “Qualified Purchaser” Release, supra note 268, at *11.  
 411. See supra text accompanying note 386. 
 412. See Borg Letter, supra note 260, at 1; Letter from Deborah R. Bortner, Director of 
Securities, Securities Division of the Washington State Department of Financial Institu-
tions, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 25, 
2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72301/bortner1.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); 
Letter from Deborah L. Dye Joyce, Commissioner of Securities, Ohio Division of Securities, 
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 21, 2002), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72301/joyce1.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); Letter 
from John A. Maher, Commissioner, Robert M. Lam, Chairman, and A. Richard Gerber, 
Commissioner, Pennsylvania Securities Commission, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. 
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March 2002 letter to the SEC commenting on the SEC’s proposed 
definition of qualified purchaser, NASAA wrote: 
States frequently use violations of their registration provisions as 
the basis for stopping fraud. A state regulator can issue a cease 
and desist order or obtain a preliminary injunction by simply prov-
ing the existence of a security and the absence of an effective regis-
tration statement. Were the states, because of preemption, unable 
to use this tool, they would have to devote substantial time and ef-
fort to prove fraud, which prolongs the public’s exposure to harm 
and further taxes limited state resources.413  
The above points have merit. That is why, as mentioned above, my 
proposed exemption limits general solicitation and advertising 
through (1) broker-dealers registered with the SEC and the states in 
which the solicitation is directed and (2) certain company personnel. 
This is consistent with the current regime, implicitly endorsed by the 
SEC,414 whereby broker-dealers play a key role in securing private 
equity capital for emerging companies by establishing relationships 
with a pool of accredited investors and “renting” these relationships 
to companies.415 The exemption would further provide that company 
personnel who engage in general solicitation and advertising must 
also comply with any applicable state registration requirements. This 
would then allow a state to enact regulations requiring the registra-
tion of company personnel engaging in general solicitation and ad-
vertising under the new exemption. 
 As a result, adoption of the new exemption, including state pre-
emption, would not foreclose states from using violations of their reg-
istration provisions as the basis for stopping fraud. Such adoption 
would just shift the focus from state securities registration provisions 
to state broker-dealer/company solicitor registration provisions.  
                                                                                                                    
Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 19, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/pro-
posed/s72301/lam1.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); Letter from Matthew Nestor, Director, 
Massachusetts Securities Division, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange    Commission    (Feb.   25,   2002),       http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72301/ 
nestor1.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); Letter from S. Anthony Taggart, Director, Utah 
Division of Securities, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
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thomas1.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
 413. Borg Letter, supra note 260, at 5. 
 414. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 415. See supra Part III.C. 
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The prohibition against general solicitation and advertising in 
private placements of securities has persisted for seventy years. This 
persistence is not the result of strong ideology, but is the result of a 
seventy-year-old statutory distinction between public offerings and 
private or limited offerings entrenched by overlapping federal and 
state securities regulations. This persistence is surprising, especially 
following the enactment of NSMIA, given the importance of emerging 
companies to the United States economy and the importance of pri-
vate equity capital to emerging companies. While there appears to be 
no shortage of potential or latent angel investors willing to invest in 
emerging companies, the prohibition greatly limits the methods by 
which an emerging company can attempt to reach these investors. 
The end result is a funding gap for emerging companies seeking 
start-up and early-stage financing. 
 The SEC and the states have recognized the impediment the pro-
hibition places on fundraising efforts by small and emerging compa-
nies and have taken steps to loosen the prohibition. These steps, 
however, do not go far enough. Hence, this Article has proposed a 
new private placement exemption which would allow a company and 
its investment banking firm to utilize the full range of marketing 
techniques when raising private equity capital. By limiting the appli-
cation of the proposed exemption to offerings (1) where only accred-
ited investors can participate and (2) which are made exclusively 
through registered broker-dealers and company personnel, it strikes 
the appropriate balance between investor protection and capital for-
mation. 
 
  
